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Are Jurisprudential Debates 
Conceptual? Some Lessons from 
Democratic Theory
DAN PRIEL *
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. Th is article started its life as part of an essay 
that I presented to audiences in the universities of Oxford, Illinois, Warwick, and Yale. 
Audiences there helped me realize that a separation was required, so that the three beasts 
imprisoned in the essay would be able to breathe more freely on their own. An earlier version 
of this article was presented in Edinburgh University and University of Texas School of Law. 
I thank participants on all occasions for their comments. In particular I wish to thank Larry 
Sager, John Ferejohn, and Mitch Berman for many questions that forced me to clarify my 
argument. I also thank Charles Barzun and three anonymous referees for the Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal for their detailed written comments. I also wish to thank the editors of the 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal for their excellent editorial assistance.
The dominant view among legal philosophers is that jurisprudential debates about the 
nature of law are conceptual. In this article I challenge this view. I do so by comparing these 
debates to debates about the justifi cation of democracy and showing that the arguments 
found in both are often very similar. I demonstrate that in both domains, there are arguments 
on one side that explain an institution (either law or democracy) in terms of its ability to help 
people lead a better life, and there are arguments on the other side that highlight the value 
of these institutions in promoting political participation. The arguments for democracy 
are unquestionably normative, and I argue this suggests that the jurisprudential arguments 
are normative as well. Based on this conclusion, I then offer some tentative suggestions 
for rethinking familiar jurisprudential terrains—now usually understood as dealing with 
conceptual questions—in normative terms.
L’opinion dominante chez les théoriciens du droit est que les débats jurisprudentiels sur la 
nature du droit sont de nature conceptuelle. Dans cet article, je conteste ce point de vue. 
Pour ce faire, je compare ces débats à ceux sur la justification de la démocratie et je 
démontre que les arguments sont souvent dans les deux cas fort semblables. Je démontre 
que, dans les deux cas, il y a d’une part des arguments qui défi nissent une institution (soit 
le droit ou la démocratie) en termes de sa capacité de permettre aux gens de mener une 
meilleure vie et, d’autre part, il y a des arguments qui mettent en relief les valeurs de ces 
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THESE DAYS A WIDE GULF exists between legal and political philosophy. Th e 
main reason for this is the orthodox view among legal philosophers that the 
primary task of jurisprudence is to give a morally and politically neutral account 
of the nature of law—that is, an account of what law in general is. Th is is presented 
as an inquiry that is fundamentally diff erent from an investigation into the law 
in any particular jurisdiction or in any particular area of law. According to this 
prevailing view, off ering an account of that nature is believed to be the primary, and 
distinct, task of jurisprudence. 1 Consequently, proponents of this view (mostly 
1. See e.g. Joseph Raz, Th e Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009) at 104-05 [Raz, Authority of Law]; Joseph Raz, Between Authority and 
Interpretation: On the Th eory of Law and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009) at 91-92 [Raz, Between Authority]; Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Th eory (Oxford: 
Hart, 2001) at 17; Leslie Green, “General Jurisprudence: A 25th Anniversary Essay” (2005) 
25:4 Oxford J Legal Stud 565 at 567; Leslie Green, “Positivism and the Inseparability of Law 
and Morals” (2008) 83:4 NYUL Rev 1035 at 1036; Andrei Marmor, “Th e Nature of Law” in 
Edward N Zalta, ed, Th e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online: <http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/win2011/entries/lawphil-nature>; Kenneth Einar Himma, “Situating Dworkin: 
Th e Logical Space between Legal Positivism and Natural Law Th eory” (2002) 27:1 Okla City 
UL Rev 41 at 43; cf Jeremy Waldron, “Legal and Political Philosophy” in Jules Coleman & 
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institutions dans la promotion de la participation politique. Dans le cas de la démocratie, les 
arguments sont indéniablement normatifs et je fais valoir qu’il en découle que les arguments 
qui défi nissent la jurisprudence sont également normatifs. En me fondant sur cette conclusion, 
je propose ensuite des pistes de solution permettant de redéfi nir des terrains familiers de 
la jurisprudence – que l’on considère actuellement de manière générale comme étant de 
nature conceptuelle – en termes normatifs.
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but not exclusively legal positivists) insist that their account of law is “conceptual” 
and “normatively inert,” that it is merely a “descriptive” and “morally neutral” 
explication of what law is . 2 I will call this view conceptualism. At fi rst the 
conceptualist divide seems compelling: It is natural to think that law exists 
in democracies and dictatorships, and that it is found in liberal societies as well 
as in socially conservative ones. It thus seems natural to seek to know what it is 
that makes something into law regardless of the political environment in which 
it is found.
Nonetheless, this view has been challenged, most prominently by Ronald 
Dworkin, who over the years has argued that the conceptualist understanding 
of jurisprudence is fundamentally misguided. Jurisprudence, he argues, should 
be conceived of as a branch of political or moral philosophy, and, as such, as 
thoroughly political. According to Dworkin, the error conceptualists commit 
is a special case of a broader philosophical error he calls Archimedeanism. 3 
Archimedeanism is the view that one can give a neutral description of moral 
and political concepts and that one can separate inquiry into the nature of 
moral and political concepts from substantive moral and political discourse. 
In a series of writings, Dworkin has argued that Archimedeanism is mistaken. 
He has then applied his view to a number of contexts including jurisprudence, 
an area in which Dworkin argues most scholars continue to write under the 
Archimedean spell. 4 
Scott Shapiro, eds, Th e Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) 352 at 376 (describing and criticizing this approach). 
2. See e.g. HLA Hart, Th e Concept of Law, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 
239 [Hart, Concept of Law]; Michael S Moore, Educating Oneself in Public: Critical Essays in 
Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 308-09 (describing his enterprise 
as “descriptive general jurisprudence” and contrasting it with normative jurisprudence); 
Michael Bayles, “Hart vs. Dworkin,” (1991) 10:4 Law & Phil 349 at 380; Jules L Coleman, 
“Negative and Positive Positivism” (1982) 11:1 J Legal Stud 139 at 147 (contrasting 
normative and conceptual inquiries); John Gardner, “Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths” (2001) 46 
Am J Juris 199 at 203; Andrei Marmor, Philosophy of Law (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2011) at 10, 109-35 [Marmor, Philosophy of Law]; Michael Giudice, “Analytical 
Jurisprudence and Contingency” in Maksymilian Del Mar, ed, New Waves in Philosophy of 
Law (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 58 at 59, 65 (“Hartian conceptual 
analysis is not normative or political philosophy …”); G Marshall, “Positivism, Adjudication, 
and Democracy” in PMS Hacker & J Raz, eds, Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of 
H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) 132 at 144.
3. See Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006) at 33-34, 
162-83 [Dworkin, Justice in Robes].
4. See generally Ronald Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It” (1996) 25:2 
Phil & Pub Aff  87; Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge: Harvard University 
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Several jurisprudential conceptualists responded by rejecting Dworkin’s 
attack on Archimedeanism .5 Fortunately, we need not enter into these debates 
here, because I believe we can reach conclusions that are similar to Dworkin’s 
by going through what may be his diff erent line of argument, and that is by 
examining the actual arguments used by legal positivists and showing that they 
are not really conceptual.6 
In the past I have advanced various theoretical arguments that do not depend 
on Dworkin’s anti-Archimedeanism and purport to show the claims of concep-
tualists are false.7 Th ose arguments challenged the possibility of conceptual inquiry 
about the nature of law. Th ough I still think these arguments are successful, I 
employ a diff erent strategy in this article. I compare some of the debates between 
legal positivists and Dworkin to debates among theorists of democracy, and I 
show that there is remarkable similarity between them. Th is lends credence to 
the claim that jurisprudential disagreements are not conceptual. More precisely, 
I develop the following argument:
1. Most legal positivists claim that many jurisprudential debates 
are conceptual;
2. Debates about the justifi cation of democracy are normative, not 
conceptual;
Press, 2011) at 23-96 [Dworkin, Hedgehogs].
5. See Raz, Between Authority, supra note 1 at 67-76 (developing an alternative account of 
theoretical disagreement); James Allan, “Truth’s Empire – A Reply to Ronald Dworkin’s 
‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It’” (2001) 26 Austl J Legal Phil 61; Kenneth 
M Ehrenberg, “Archimedean Metaethics Defended” (2008) 39:4-5 Metaphilosophy 508. 
Th ough making many valid points, these arguments have not fully understood Dworkin’s 
position, in particular the signifi cance of the relationship between law and morality to his 
view. Th ese ideas can be found in many of his earlier works, but this view has been most 
explicit in his last book. See ibid at 400-09.
6. Th ere are occasions in which Dworkin seems to reach this conclusion without the anti-
Archimedean baggage. See Dworkin, Justice in Robes, supra note 3 at 166-67, 216. Whether 
these two strands of argument really are diff erent is unclear. Many of Dworkin’s early 
arguments against legal positivism seem to me to be merely less choate forms of the later 
argument against Archimedeanism. Dworkin himself suggests so (ibid at 234). As this 
exegetical point has no bearing on this paper, we can set it aside. Th ere are others challenging 
conceptual jurisprudence in somewhat similar terms. See Gerald J Postema, “Jurisprudence as 
Practical Philosophy” (1998) 4:3 Legal Th eory 329; Stephen R Perry, “Hart’s Methodological 
Positivism” in Jules Coleman, ed, Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to Th e Concept of 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 311 at 347-53. None of them, however, has 
put forth the challenge found in this article.
7. See Danny Priel, “Evaluating Descriptive Jurisprudence” (2007) 52 Am J Juris 139; Dan 
Priel, “Description and Evaluation in Jurisprudence” (2010) 29:6 Law & Phil 633. 
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3. Th e debates between legal positivists and Dworkin in jurisprudence 
are very similar in structure and content to debates on the justifi cation 
of democracy; and hence
4. It is very likely that, contrary to (1), debates between legal positivists 
and Dworkin are really normative.
It is clear that even if all premises of this argument are true, this argument is 
clearly not one of deductive entailment; and of course, one of its premises may be 
false. Th e burden of this article is to show why this is a good argument. What 
this outline demonstrates is that, on its own, this article’s argument is rather 
limited. Alone, it does not show that conceptual jurisprudence is impossible; 
rather, it seeks to show that even if conceptual jurisprudence is possible, much of 
what is nowadays taken to belong to the conceptual part of jurisprudence is not 
conceptual. Th ough limited in this way, I think the argument, if successful, is of 
great signifi cance. Th e conceptualist view dominates contemporary jurisprudence. 
Th erefore, showing that a signifi cant part of what is supposedly conceptual is 
actually not can help move debates in what I hope is a more fruitful direction. 
For this reason I tentatively develop ideas for new avenues for jurisprudential 
inquiry, which I think are opened once we see that some central contemporary 
jurisprudential debates are not conceptual. 
I set out to do this as follows: In Part I, I begin by looking in some detail at 
jurisprudential debates that conceptualists claim to be politically neutral disagreements 
about the nature of law. I focus on debates between legal positivists and Dworkin, 
and I demonstrate how similar these debates are to two competing views about 
the value and justifi cation of democracy. I distinguish between two goals, that of 
guidance and that of participation in the political process, and I show that we fi nd 
justifi cation for both law and democracy in these terms. I then argue that there is 
a good correlation between the views legal positivists express about law and their 
more explicitly political justifi cations of democracy, and that a similar correlation 
exists between Dworkin’s views on law and his views on democracy. Th en, in Part 
II, I turn back to the law to show how these competing justifi cations can help us 
understand jurisprudential arguments about the rule of law, legal interpretation, 
and judicial dissent. Finally, in Part III, I make some tentative suggestions as to 
the direction jurisprudence should take once its political foundations are brought 
to light. Specifi cally, I propose a new way of thinking about the debates between 
positivists and anti-positivists, a new perspective on law and democracy, and a 
better way of understanding competing jurisprudential theories.
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I. JURISPRUDENCE AND DEMOCRACY
A. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY
What is the point of having laws? What is it that they do to us? You might 
think that these questions, if they make sense at all, have many answers: laws 
prohibit and permit; they empower and give immunity; they suggest and they 
demand; they create social meanings and work to change existing ones; they try 
to strengthen some social norms and eradicate others; they help create wealth, 
and they are used to redistribute it. Th e list could go on and on. Perhaps, however, 
there is a more general question we can ask about all this, and it is how does law 
go about doing all that? To this question, legal positivists and Dworkin give radically 
diff erent answers.
Legal positivists provide the simpler answer. In their picture, the main, and 
perhaps only, general purpose that can be properly ascribed to all law is the guidance 
of conduct . 8 Th is guidance function exists in order to avoid the need to contemplate 
and deliberate on the question of how one should act and precisely to relieve people 
from the need to think about their rights and duties and the rights and duties of 
others. 9 Th e most infl uential version of this argument, developed in numerous 
works by Joseph Raz, highlights this point by calling it “the service conception” of 
8. Hart, Concept of Law, supra note 2 at 249 (“I think it quite vain to seek any more specifi c 
purpose which law as such serves beyond providing guides to human conduct and standards 
of criticism of such conduct.”). For similar views, see Marmor, Philosophy of Law, supra 
note 2 at 134 (discussing law’s “pivotal function of guiding human conduct”); Joseph Raz, 
Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, revised ed (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995) at 215-17, 230-31 [Raz, Ethics] (“what cannot communicate with 
people cannot have authority over them,” at 217); Matthew H Kramer, Where Law and 
Morality Meet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 6; Raz, Authority of Law, supra 
note 1 at 214; Scott J Shapiro, “On Hart’s Way Out” in Jules Coleman, ed, Hart’s Postscript: 
Essays on the Postscript to Th e Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 149 
at 169-182; Jules L Coleman, Th e Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to 
Legal Th eory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 70, 101 (“Whatever ends it serves, 
however, the distinctive feature of law according to most positivists is that it serves these ends 
through rules that purport to guide conduct. Law guides conduct by off ering reasons for 
action,” at 101); cf Hart, Concept of Law, supra note 2 at 94-95.
9. See Raz, Ethics, supra note 8 at 207; Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical 
Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) 
at 146; PS Atiyah, “Form and Substance in Contract Law” in Essays on Contract (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986) 93 at 93-96, 99-101 (“ … [rules save] us from having to worry about 
reasons and arguments …”); Neil MacCormick, “Th e Concept of Law and ‘Th e Concept 
of Law’” (1994) 14:1 Oxford J Legal Stud 1 at 6-7; Scott J Shapiro, Legality (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011) at 138, 152-53, 173, 195 [Shapiro, Legality].
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authority, according to which the “role and primary normal function [of authority] 
is to serve the governed.” 10 On this view one turns to the law, i.e., one relies on 
law’s authority, in the same way one turns to an expert on a particular question, 
namely in order to learn from it what to do .11 Under this approach, the justifi cation 
for following the law, and the limits of law’s authority, are straightforward: One is 
normally justifi ed in following the law because, and to the extent that, by doing 
so one is more likely to comply with the reasons one has than by trying to work 
out those reasons on one’s own. 12 All this is presented as a conceptual truth about 
the nature of law.13
Against this model of law, the picture of law Dworkin presents is radically 
diff erent. He asserts that law is not there to guide people or to instruct them how 
to act. Rather, law is an endeavour in which a community engages in order to 
articulate for itself the right principles to govern it. Dworkin presents the positivist 
account of law as one according to which “law provides a settled, public and 
dependable set of standards for private and offi  cial conduct, standards whose 
force cannot be called into question by some individual offi  cial’s perception of 
policy or morality.” 14 He is explicit in rejecting this account in favour of 
10. Joseph Raz, Th e Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 56 [Raz, Morality 
of Freedom]. For Raz’s most recent thoughts on the service conception of authority, see Raz, 
Between Authority, supra note 1 at 134-42.
11. In following the authority of law we are relying on the “law’s superior knowledge,” and in 
doing this “[t]he law … is [to us] like a knowledgeable friend.” Raz, Ethics, supra note 8 
at 348. Raz considers another possibility: that law is there to coordinate action. But the 
distinction between the two is less clear than it seems. Even the coordination function is 
premised on the idea that a coordinated solution will be better than a non-coordinated 
one, and that the costs of generating coordination through law (including moral costs) 
will be lower than the benefi ts of coordination. (Th is is why we leave many aspects of life 
uncoordinated.) In other words, the justifi cation of generating coordination through law 
must presuppose something very much like the idea of law as a “knowledgeable friend.” 
Indeed, just like in the former case, where an expert has, according to Raz, no obligation to 
obey the law because of his or her superior knowledge, in the case of coordination “[a] person 
who understand the situation will often have reason to go beyond the law, and to do more 
than the law requires in pursuit of the same co-ordinating goal” (ibid at 349). 
12. See Raz, Morality of Freedom, supra note 10 at 53; Raz, Between Authority, supra note 1 at 
136-37.
13. See e.g. Jules L Coleman, “Methodology,” in Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds, Th e 
Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002) 311 at 341 (“[T]he function of guiding conduct … [is not a] moral argument about 
law’s proper function,” but rather a “kind of functional explanation of law. … [It] is part of 
the explanation of its existence and persistence, as well as the shape law takes in its mature 
forms.”).
14. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, revised ed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
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“a diff erent and more ambitious” one,15 in which “[c]itizens are encouraged to 
suppose that each has rights and duties against other citizens, and against their 
common government … .” 16 In this way the law “encourage[s them] to frame and 
test hypotheses about what these rights are … . ” 17 Law, in other words, is not a set 
of rules to which we turn for guidance and which provides this guidance exactly 
by mediating between us and the normative considerations about how we should 
live. Rather, law is there to perform the exact opposite function, to get us to 
engage in those moral and political considerations.18 We discover what we ought 
to do according to law at the end of a moral inquiry, not through a classifi catory 
inquiry of identifying from a whole range of available legal norms the one norm 
that is applicable to our situation, and then following it. 
Another way of making this point is by considering the place of rules in 
Dworkin’s account. Positivists view rules and guidance as inseparable: Law 
consists of rules because rules provide guidance, and guidance is the point of law. 
Dworkin, however, denies the existence of legal rules (in this sense); his emphasis 
on the idea that law is made up of principles (or later, of reasons), is a rejection of 
the view that law can ever provide guidance in the form of a rule to be identifi ed and 
followed. As he puts it, “Th ere is no such thing as ‘the law’ as a collection of discrete 
propositions, each with its own canonical form.”19 
Dworkin draws on these ideas to develop his conception of the rule of law 
“that does not distinguish … between the rule of law and substantive justice.” 20 
Th e rule of law, says Dworkin, is not satisfi ed when answers to political questions 
1978) at 347 [Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously].
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid at 338.  
17. Ibid. What Dworkin says here is close to the model of reciprocal law developed earlier 
by Fuller. See Lon L Fuller, Th e Morality of Law, revised ed (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1969) at 139-40. Fuller was an anti-positivist. By contrast, though Raz talks of a 
right to political participation, he nowhere considers it a goal of law to encourage political 
participation. See Raz, Authority of Law, supra note 1 at 271-72.
18. Dworkin draws a similar contrast between the view (which he attributes to Raz) according to 
which people accept “moral rules [such as the rule that one must always keep his promises] 
for the guidance of [their] conduct,” and his own view, according to which “moral argument 
or decision is a matter of giving reasons for or against the morality of a certain course of 
conduct, rather than appealing to rules set down in advance whether by social or individual 
decision.” Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 14 at 72 [emphasis added]. Th ough 
he refers to moral rules, Dworkin’s views on the relationship between legal and moral 
reasoning, as well as the italicized word, make this contrast applicable to law as well.
19. Ibid at 344. 
20. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) at 12 
[Dworkin, Principle].
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are “drawn from a public book,” where we fi nd previously prepared answers to 
practical problems; Dworkin dismissively calls this “the rule of legal texts.” 21 Th e 
rule of law is satisfi ed when political bodies (courts, legislatures, the executive) 
and citizens engage in this moral inquiry, and in particular when they succeed, 
through their joint endeavours to provide the correct interpretation of what the 
law demands. Th is view of law is thus deeply tied to a particular “republican” 
conception of self-government. 22 
How do these abstract ideas translate into something (more or less) recognizable 
as reality? Dworkin’s ideal lawyer is his super-human judge Hercules, who 
reviews the entire legal history in order to discover the right answer to every 
case.23 Th ough well known, the signifi cance of this idea has not been adequately 
recognized. If Dworkin had been interested in philosopher-kings in the form of 
judges, he would have made his Hercules morally omniscient—one who simply 
knows what to do at any given moment. But such a fi gure, while perhaps satisfying the 
positivist model of law with its superior knowledge, would not match the ideal of 
self-government. Morality by its nature is a communal enterprise of discussion and 
debate; moral right and wrong are matters that are not “out there” to discover 
but that emerge from interpretation of the attitudes of diff erent members of 
a community in an eff ort to make them as coherent as possible. In describing this 
view, Dworkin once wrote that one of its “appealing” aspects is that “[i]t is well 
suited to group consideration of problems of justice, that is, to developing a 
theory that can be said to be the theory of a community rather than of particular 
individuals … .”24 
21. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 14 at 338. 
22. See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: Th e Moral Reading of the American Constitution 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) at 111 [Dworkin, Freedom’s Law] (“our 
government shall be republican rather than despotic”). Scott Shapiro has argued that 
republican ideals that motivated the founders of the United States undermine Dworkin’s 
view of law. See Shapiro, Legality, supra note 9 at 324-30. But Dworkin’s views are defi nitely 
in line with some republican thought. See Michael J Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America 
in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) at 4-7, 317-
21. Sandel’s version of “republican politics” that is “more clamorous than consensual,” in 
which “public institutions” such as “townships, schools, religions, and virtue-sustaining 
occupations” “gather people together in various capacities” (ibid at 320-21) bears strong 
similarities to Dworkin’s views. Th is will be discussed later in this Part. Furthermore, even 
if Shapiro is correct in his historical account of American law, it is not clear how this can 
challenge Dworkin’s view on conceptual grounds. See text following note 62.
23. See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986) at 239-54 
[Dworkin, Law’s Empire].
24. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 14 at 163 [emphasis added]. When directly 
charged with the claim that his theory cannot explain the conceptual truth that something 
can be law only if it guides conduct, Dworkin replied that his theory can do that, if guidance 
(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL368
Judges are not observers in this community of principle; rather, they are 
active participants and even leaders in these political debates.25 A crucial but 
unappreciated aspect of Dworkin’s emphasis on judges, however, is that Hercules 
is not only a model for the judge. Dworkin contemplates a society of Herculeses, 
and sees law as central in creating such a society. True citizenship for him is 
something that people earn by engaging in political debate. 26 It is important to 
understand that, for Dworkin, it is not just that there is value in engaging in 
this moral inquiry (alongside the value in fi nding out the right thing to do). It 
is more accurate to say that, according to Dworkin, there is no moral truth for 
that community without such an inquiry. Self-government is not merely valuable 
alongside the guidance of conduct law provides; in a way, it makes no sense to 
talk about legal guidance outside the context of self-government. Similarly, it 
makes no sense to talk about legitimate law if it is imposed from above, no matter 
how wise Hercules is. 
With this characterization in mind, what separates legal positivists and Dworkin 
is not the conditions of validity, but a diff erent issue altogether: the question of 
what makes law potentially justifi ed. Both accounts are part of a broader answer 
to the question of what could, in principle, give law authority—what gives it the 
right to tell people what to do. According to the positivist answer, law has de 
facto authority to the extent that it is taken to guide people to what they ought 
to do, and it has legitimate authority (i.e., it is justifi ed) to the extent that it in 
fact fulfi lls this task.27 It is true that on this view a law normally lacks justifi cation 
when it provides the wrong guidance. Th is, however, is a specifi c judgment applied 
to individual cases; it does not undermine the general underlying point that law 
is understood in the sense that “it is possible for people to form the opinion, on the basis of 
arguments available to them, that [a proposition of law] is true.” Ronald Dworkin, “Th irty 
Years On,” Book Review of Th e Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to 
Legal Th eory by Jules L Coleman, (2002) 115:6 Harv L Rev 1655 at 1685. Even here, then, 
law guides not by giving instructions that release one from thinking about moral argument, 
but by forcing people to engage in “arguments available to them.” 
25. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 14 at 338 (“Th e courts participate in this 
process, by providing an occasional forum for public considerations of these controversial 
issues of justice, and by providing leadership whose power is rightly qualifi ed by the force of 
the arguments it can command.”).
26. See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: Th e Th eory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2000) at 372 [Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue].
27. See Raz, Authority of Law, supra note 1 at 28-29. “A person has eff ective or de facto authority 
only if the people over whom he has that authority regard him as a legitimate authority. … 
A common factor in all kinds of eff ective authority is that they involve a belief by some that 
the person concerned has legitimate authority. … [T]he explanation of eff ective authority 
presupposes that of legitimate authority” (ibid) [footnotes omitted].
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is potentially legitimate to the extent that it provides guidance on how to act, 
which frees agents from engaging in weighing any normative issues themselves. 
It is the combination of these two ideas—on what gives law de facto authority 
and what gives it legitimate authority—that explains why legal positivists have 
no diffi  culty with unjust law still being considered law, yet at the same time also 
think that the gunman situation writ large is not one of law.28 Th e gunman 
situation is not one that could be potentially legitimate. 
Th is is not a purely conceptual claim. It is a controversial political claim 
about what can give government the right, even in principle, to tell people what 
to do. Th at this is a normative claim becomes clearer when we contrast it with 
Dworkin’s view. On this view law is justifi ed to the extent that it is a product of a 
community’s acts of self-government, and self-government is achieved only when 
its members engage in the normative considerations applied to them. Since law 
making in this sense is a constant enterprise of thinking and rethinking of our 
rights and obligations towards each other, what makes law potentially legitimate 
is that it is structured in such a way that it gets people to constantly engage with 
the normative considerations that apply to them. When juxtaposed, it is clear 
that these are more than slightly diff erent views on law; they are in a certain sense 
diametrically opposed, and these confl icting views go to the heart of the confl ict 
between legal positivists and Dworkin. 29 
28. Hart claimed that a legal system is not “the gunman situation writ large,” i.e., that it is not 
simply in the business of issuing threats, like a gunman, only on a large scale. See Hart, 
Concept of Law, supra note 2 at 7, 82-85 (distinguishing between “the gunman situation writ 
large” and a legal system).
29. Th e discussion in the text helps understand why it is wrong to think that Dworkin’s rejection 
of legal positivism was based on his diff erent view on law’s conditions of validity. See e.g. 
Andrei Marmor, Positive Law and Objective Values (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
at 49-50 [Marmor, Positive Law]; Mitchell N Berman, “Constitutional Th eory and the 
Rule of Recognition: Toward a Fourth Th eory of Law” in Matthew D Adler & Kenneth 
Einar Himma, eds, Th e Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009) 269 at 287-88. I should add that despite this mistaken reading 
of Dworkin, Berman advances cogent criticisms of Hart’s legal positivism in his essay. In 
fact, I believe his view is closer to Dworkin’s than he imagines. Dworkin rejects the entire 
positivist edifi ce according to which we fi rst identify valid norms and then their content, and 
therefore validity has no role in his account: “I do want to reject … the picture of ‘existing 
law,’” according to which “the law of a community is a distinct collection of particular rules 
and principles … such that it is a sensible question to ask whether, at any given moment, a 
particular rule or principle belongs to that collection. … I did not mean, in rejecting the idea 
that law is a system of rules, to replace that idea with the theory that law is a system of rules 
and principles.” Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 14 at 343-44; see also Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 14 at 44, 76. Dworkin thinks that law’s authority is 
exercised by directing us to engage in moral issues in order to determine the content of legal 
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How is all this related to democracy? One central question discussed among 
theorists of democracy is, naturally, what justifi es democracy. Even though for 
most people living now in the West democracy appears natural and quite possibly 
the only legitimate form of government, it is actually a relative newcomer on the 
political scene,30 one that met considerable resistance in its early days.31 Of the 
many available arguments for democracy, I wish to focus here on two general 
approaches. One type of justifi cation, often known as “epistemic,” is premised 
on the view that “the aim of democracy is to ‘track the truth.’ … [D]emocracy is 
more desirable than alternative forms of decision-making because, and insofar as, 
it does that.” 32 At its most extreme, one may believe that whenever the democratic 
process operates well, one may take the majority’s view as irrefutable proof of the 
correct decisions. Jean-Jacques Rousseau seems to have held this view when he 
stated, “When … the opinion contrary to my own prevails, this proves only that 
I have made a mistake, and that what I believed to be the general will was not 
so.” 33 On some interpretations of this view, then, the majority’s view constitutes 
the right course of action. Less strongly, someone may hold that democracy is 
justifi ed because it is a decision-making procedure that tends to produce right 
answers. 34 Why might we think that? Th e best-known argument for this view is 
based on an idea fi rst developed by the French Enlightenment thinker Nicolas 
de Condorcet. He proved mathematically that when a sizable group of people 
is collectively required to answer a question, if each member knows the correct 
answer with a probability higher than 0.5, then the likelihood of their combined 
answer being right approaches 1 as the size of the group increases.35 Th is so-called 
norms. I explain what is at stake between legal positivists and their opponents. See Dan Priel, 
“Th e Place of Legitimacy in Legal Th eory” (2011) 57:1 McGill LJ 1.
30. Th e ancient democratic city states were very diff erent from modern democracy, so much 
so that by today’s standards they would probably not count as true democracies. Indeed, to 
those who fi rst experimented in what we now call democracy, the Athenian model was one 
that had to be avoided. See John Keane, Th e Life and Death of Democracy (New York: WW 
Norton & Company, 2009) at 275-79.
31. See John Dunn, Democracy: A History (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005) at 13-15.
32. Christian List & Robert E Goodin, “Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet 
Jury Th eorem” (2001) 9:3 J Pol Phil 277 at 277; accord Joshua Cohen, “An Epistemic 
Conception of Democracy” (1986) 97:1 Ethics 26 at 29. 
33. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Th e Social Contract, translated by Maurice Cranston 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968) at 153.
34. For an interpretation of Rousseau as holding this weaker view, see Bernard Grofman & Scott 
L Feld, “Rousseau’s General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective” (1988) 82:2 Am Pol Sci Rev 
567; BM Barry, “Th e Public Interest” (1964) 38 Proc Aristotelian Soc’y Supp 1 at 12-13.
35. See “Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Th eory of Decision-Making” in Keith 
Michael Baker, ed, Condorcet: Selected Writings 33 at 48-50 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
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Condorcet Jury Th eorem has been exploited recently to defend majoritarian 
decision making.36 
Th is conception of democracy has implications not only for the justifi cation 
of majority rule, but also for the other component usually associated with democracy, 
namely the protection of certain rights and freedoms. Perhaps because democracies, 
more than other forms of government, depend on the aggregation of dispersed 
information, they need to allow more freedom to their subjects. So on this view 
freedom of speech is largely justifi ed by its informational value; the promotion 
of a culture of vigorous discussion and the protection of unpopular views are 
defensible because they lead to better decision making. 
Interestingly, if we look at the work of legal positivists who have written 
about democracy we see that many of them embrace similar ideas. Jeremy Bentham 
had a tortuous relationship with democracy, arguing for and against it at diff erent 
times of his life.37 But he ultimately settled on support for virtually universal suff rage, 
including women. Bentham’s justifi cation for democracy was instrumental: As 
his fundamental moral principle was the greatest happiness for the greatest number 
of people, he believed that “general consent” is “the surest visible sign and 
1976). (Th is is a translation of excerpts from the introduction to a book that summarizes 
informally what is proven mathematically later in the book. See Nicolas de Condorcet, Essai 
sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (Paris: 
L’Imprimerie Royale, 1785). Interestingly Condorcet himself considered this an argument 
against democracy as he thought most people were insuffi  ciently knowledgeable (ibid at 
50-51). Francis Galton made one of the fi rst explicit attempts of justifying the ability of 
democracy to aggregate dispersed information held by members of society. See Francis 
Galton, “Vox Populi” (1907) 75:1949 Nature 450; Francis Galton, “Th e Ballot-Box” (1907) 
75:1952 Nature 509. 
36. See e.g. List & Goodin, supra note 32; Grofman & Feld, supra note 34; David Estlund, 
“Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: Th e Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority” in 
James Bohman & William Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1997) 173. For a slightly diff erent argument about the 
relationship between democracy and truth, see Ian Shapiro, Th e Moral Foundations of Politics 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003) at 202 (emphasizing how democracy “giv[es] 
political aspirants incentives to shine light in dark corners and expose one another’s failures 
and dissembling”). Th is is close to Bentham’s utilitarian arguments related to democracy’s 
ability to better control potentially corrupt rulers. See HLA Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies 
in Jurisprudence and Political Th eory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) at 68-69; cf Jacob 
Viner, “Bentham and J.S. Mill: Th e Utilitarian Background” (1949) 39:2 Am Econ Rev 360 
at 364 (“the standard line of the Benthamites” was “that only by democratic voting could 
there be an adequate guarantee that legislators would always or predominantly serve the 
general interest …” [emphasis in original]).
37. See Philip Schofi eld, Utility and Democracy: Th e Political Th ought of Jeremy Bentham (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006) at 78-108, 137-70.
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immediate evidence of general utility.” 38 Th us, democracy for Bentham was 
justifi ed by providing the sort of information required for knowing which courses 
of action are more likely to be conducive to general utility.39 While I believe Bentham 
was in many respects very diff erent from contemporary legal positivists, like them 
he saw law as being primarily concerned with the guidance of conduct. 40
Similar views are found in the work of contemporary legal positivists, even 
those who are not utilitarians. Raz developed the very infl uential account of 
authority we encountered above, and its application to law is familiar. It is less well-
known that Raz extended this argument to democracy. He wrote that “[d]emocracy 
is justifi ed inasmuch as it is necessary to serve the well-being of people. It shares 
the general structure of authority and relies, for its legitimacy, on its ability to 
deliver sound decisions.” 41 
Perhaps the best illustration of my point comes, surprisingly, from examining 
an argument for democracy off ered by a legal positivist who seems at fi rst like 
a counterexample to my suggestion of a link between positivists’ view of the 
authority of law and democracy. Andrei Marmor is a legal positivist who has 
argued that democracy can be justifi ed not only to the extent that it promotes 
right answers, but also because of considerations of “fairness.” 42 Closer inspection, 
however, reveals that even when talking about fairness his argument remains 
squarely within an instrumental, “service” justifi cation for democracy. Marmor 
explicitly follows Raz’s views on authority and, like him, thinks that they apply 
both to law and to democracy. 43 Nonetheless, he considers the question of whether 
we would have reason to follow a mistaken democratic decision that has been 
arrived at by fair procedures (however we defi ne those) and off ers two reasons 
why we might sometimes answer this question affi  rmatively. Th e fi rst is that in 
addition to adopting the correct outcome to particular cases, we have an interest 
38. Jeremy Bentham Manuscripts, University College London, Box 127, sheet 3, cited in Ross 
Harrison, Bentham (London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983) at 214. See supra note 36 
for some of Bentham’s other utilitarian arguments.
39. See Ross Harrison, Democracy (London, UK: Routledge, 1993) at 110-11.
40. See Phillip Schofi eld, Bentham: A Guide for the Perplexed (London, UK: Continuum, 2009) 
at 139. On the diff erence between Bentham and contemporary legal positivism, see Dan 
Priel, “Towards Classical Legal Positivism” (Osgoode Hall Law School CLPE Research Paper 
Series, No 20, 2011), online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1886517>.
41. Raz, Ethics, supra note 8 at 102; see also Raz, Ethics, supra note 8 at 115-16; Raz, Between 
Authority, supra note 1 at 153, n 21.
42. See Andrei Marmor, “Authority, Equality and Democracy” (2005) 18:3 Ratio Juris 315 at 
316 [Marmor, “Democracy”]. For his defense of legal positivism see Marmor, Positive Law, 
supra note 29 at 49-88.
43. Marmor, “Democracy,” ibid at 317-18, 344.
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in maintaining just institutions. Th ese institutions, Marmor explains, may be justifi ed 
when they are “instrumentally conducive to supporting an otherwise legitimate and 
well functioning authority,” and in such instances “the duty to obey mistaken 
decisions can be derived from the duty to support just institutions.”44 
Th is argument is explicitly instrumental, but contrary to Marmor’s claims it 
fails to show that fairness plays any distinct role in justifying democracy. Marmor 
presumably thinks that we have a duty to support just institutions because such 
institutions tend to produce just (i.e., correct) decisions. (What else makes them 
just? Why else would we have a duty to support them?) But this shows that we 
should not care about democratic procedures because fairness matters, but because 
in the long run they tend to produce better decisions. More precisely, on this view 
one would be justifi ed in following a mistaken decision of a democratic institution 
only if the harm to the just institution from non-compliance with a mistaken 
decision is greater than the harm caused by following it. In those instances in 
which the harm to the institution from non-compliance is smaller than the harm 
caused by following the mistaken decision, this argument does not support following 
the mistaken decision. Even in those cases in which maintaining fair procedures is 
thought to be relevant in this way, the connection between the decision to follow 
the democratic outcome and considerations of fairness is only contingent. For 
according to this line of reasoning, if we found out that there were unfair ways 
(e.g., manipulation or deceit) of maintaining the democratic institutions that 
normally provide us with correct guidance, Marmor’s view would favour adopting 
these ways over fair ones.45 
Marmor’s second argument is that there are instances in which the right 
decisions “are not knowable, or extremely diffi  cult to ascertain, or not supported 
by enough available evidence,” and that in such cases “it may become more 
important … to have a fair decision procedure than a sound result.”46 Fairness 
is justifi ed on these occasions, says Marmor, because it is more respectful of 
44. Ibid at 342-43 [citations omitted]. It is questionable whether anyone adopting Raz’s views on 
authority need to appeal to fairness as justifi cation for following mistaken decisions. A central 
feature of following authority according to Raz is that one ought to follow it even when its 
edicts are mistaken. See Raz, Morality of Freedom, supra note 10 at 47. Properly understood, 
following mistaken decisions can be justifi ed within Raz’s general account for the justifi cation 
of authority. 
45. Th is is not a fanciful idea. A long line of theorists, beginning at least with Plato, have 
argued that the ruler is permitted, at times even required, to manipulate and deceive for the 
sake of maintaining order and justice. See Plato, Th e Republic, translated by Desmond Lee 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987) at 180-82, nn 414a-415d.
46.  Marmor, “Democracy,” supra note 42 at 343.
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autonomy. Th ere are several problems with this argument. First, if autonomy is 
important, it does not cease to be important when there is no epistemic defi ciency, 
and it should always be taken into account. Th is implies that if autonomy is a 
valuable goal, its value should be incorporated into the assessment of the extent 
to which the authority in question is justifi ed; to then rely on it when we are 
unsure about the guidance provided by the authority is to count it twice. Further, 
if we are faced with cases of epistemic defi ciency, it is not at all clear why such cases 
call for democratic decision making. We may agree for the sake of argument that 
autonomy implies equal power in decision making if opting for a collective decision 
procedure, but Marmor still needs to explain why adopting such a collective 
decision procedure is the best way to promote individuals’ autonomy. After all, 
in these circumstances those in the minority are forced to comply with a law they 
think is wrong in circumstances in which ex hypothesi we do not know whether 
the law is right or wrong. In such cases there is an obvious alternative to collective 
decision making, namely leaving the matter to diff erent people to decide on their own. 
At least prima facie this possibility should be more appealing to anyone concerned 
with autonomy. Marmor might reply that there are instances in which order or 
support for just institutions justifi es adopting one answer because leaving 
matters for individual choice would lead to chaos. Th at, however, is a controversial 
claim that would be rejected by those who are wary of the dangers of collective 
action. At the very least, it is hard to see why collective action would be superior 
to individual action as a general matter. More importantly, if that is the reason for 
opting for collective action rather than leaving it for individual choice, then we 
are back in the familiar territory that justifi es democratic procedures on instrumental 
grounds and not for reasons of fairness. For in such cases, the reason we opt for 
collective decision procedures is the chaos that would result from leaving matters 
to individual choice.
Whatever one makes of Marmor’s position and its modest concession to 
considerations of fairness, it is entirely diff erent from the way Dworkin understands 
the idea of democracy and how he defends it. One way of putting the diff erence 
is that while Marmor is (ostensibly, at least) concerned with fairness, Dworkin is 
concerned with participation;47 for Dworkin, as we have seen in the case of law, 
political engagement is crucial for there to be moral imperatives. Th is helps us 
understand why majority rule plays such a marginal role in Dworkin’s idea of 
47. On the diff erence between the two see generally Robert S Summers, “Evaluating and 
Improving Legal Processes – A Plea for ‘Process Values’” (1974) 60:1 Cornell L Rev 1 at 20-
21, 24-25. 
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democracy. 48 He allows that majorities may be useful in what he calls “choice-
sensitive” matters,49 namely (roughly) those matters of taste on which there is no 
right or wrong answer. But on other matters the mere aggregation of individuals’ 
views lacks what it takes to get to the right answers to questions of political morality. 
At one point Dworkin considers the Condorcetian argument for epistemic 
democracy and dismisses it in a single sentence: in fundamental moral matters 
“we have absolutely no right” to assume that a majority of the population is closer 
to the right answer, and therefore the aggregation of their opinion is not likely to 
lead to discovering the right course of action. 50 
Dworkin contrasts majoritarian democracy with what he calls “partnership 
democracy”—a conception of democracy that demands citizens “participate as 
equals,”51 in a “democratic discourse … that makes each citizen a partner in the 
political enterprise.”52 Th is conception of democracy is justifi ed to the extent 
that it “allow[s] citizens to govern themselves collectively through a partnership 
in which each is an active and equal partner.” 53 The similarity between 
this justifi cation of democracy and his views on law is obvious. But we can 
say more: In such a society there would presumably be less of a need for courts’ 
deliberations. Democracy, when understood correctly and functioning properly, 
is a means for turning the whole of society into a large deliberative body. It is 
48. See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 26 at 363 (“Majority rule is not fair or valuable 
in itself ”); see also Stephen Macedo, “Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and 
Institutional Design” (2010) 90:2 BUL Rev 1029 at 1030; Michael W McConnell, “Th e 
Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s Moral 
Reading of the Constitution” (1997) 65:4 Fordham L Rev 1269 at 1274 (“Dworkin assigns 
no weight whatsoever to the decision of the representative branches of government in deciding 
the case.” [emphasis in the original]).
49. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 26 at 204.
50. Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?: Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006) at 140. Dworkin has also argued that the low level of 
political discourse is antithetical to democracy (ibid at 4-6); Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 
supra note 26 at 369 (expressing concern that contemporary American politics is “the most 
degraded and negative political discourse in the democratic world” and that it has “sunk 
below the level at which we can claim, with a straight face, to be governing ourselves”). 
51. Ibid at 364 (“citizens [should] be equal not only as judges of the political process but as 
participants in it as well”).
52. Ibid; see also Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 22 at 344 (stating that on matters of 
principle, “self-respect requires that people participate, as partners in a joint venture, in the 
moral argument over the rules under which they live”).
53. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 26 at 363; see also Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 
22 at 17.
(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL376
therefore legitimate and valuable only when (and only because) it creates the 
conditions for genuine moral discourse. 
Th e connection between law and democracy is drawn even more clearly 
when Dworkin explains how in his conception of democracy “individual citizens 
can … exercise the moral responsibilities of citizenship better when fi nal 
decisions involving constitutional values are removed from ordinary politics and 
assigned to courts, whose decisions are meant to turn on principle, not on the 
weight of numbers or the balance of political infl uence.”54 Th is outcome may 
seem paradoxical at fi rst: Dworkin says here that citizens exercise their moral 
responsibilities by having the power to decide certain matters pertaining to their 
lives taken from them. It becomes less paradoxical when we remember Dworkin’s 
view of law, which seeks to encourage people to participate in the (moral) evaluation 
of their and their fellow citizens’ rights.55 As he puts it, in rather romantic (not 
to say unrealistic) terms:
When a constitutional issue has been decided by the Supreme Court, and is important 
enough so that it can be expected to be elaborated, expanded, contracted, or even 
reversed, by future decisions, a sustained national debate begins, in newspapers and 
other media, in law schools and classrooms, in public meetings and around dinner 
tables. Th at debate better matches [the] conception of republican government, in its 
emphasis on matters of principle, than almost anything the legislative process on its 
own is likely to produce. 56
Dworkin ties the two issues together when he connects his conception of law 
to that of democracy, saying that
the critical judgment of a populace is sharpened not diminished by a “protestant” 
understanding of law that allows it to disagree, in part on moral grounds, with 
offi  cial declarations of what the law requires, and that democracy means not just 
majority rule but majority rule subject to the conditions, which are moral conditions, 
that make majority rule fair.57
54. Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 22 at 344.
55. Th is approach is thus “protestant” (this will be discussed in Part III, below); in awarding 
those who decide to engage in law more political infl uence, it can thus result in great 
inequality of political power between citizens. But it seems to fi t Dworkin’s view (made in the 
context of inequalities of wealth) between “[o]ption luck” and “[b]rute luck,” according to 
which inequalities are justifi ed if they are the result of choice. See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 
supra note 26 at 73-75.
56. See Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 22 at 345; a similar description is found in Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 14 at 216. 
57. Dworkin, Justice in Robes, supra note 3 at 176.
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Th us, the seeming confl ict between law and democracy is resolved: Th ey are 
both means for getting people to engage in moral and political questions, i.e., 
to govern themselves. Beyond that, the remaining question is the empirical 
one: Which institutional mechanism does it better?58 Surprising as it may 
sound, he thinks that a “citizen’s role as a moral agent participating in his own 
governance … is sometimes better protected if the mechanisms of decision are 
not ultimately majoritarian.”59
B. CAN CONCEPTUAL JURISPRUDENCE BE SALVAGED?
My argument so far has sought to show that what seems to be at stake between 
proponents of competing justifi cations of democracy is similar to what is at stake 
between legal positivists and Dworkin when writing on law. I presented two 
competing accounts of what could make authority potentially legitimate—that 
is, what in principle could justify one person telling another what to do. On one 
view both law and democracy are justifi ed in primarily epistemic terms. According 
to this view, individuals are insuffi  ciently informed about what they should do, 
and law and democracy are therefore conceived as mechanisms for providing 
them with relevant information. Law and democracy are therefore justifi ed to 
the extent that they succeed in correctly guiding people. Dworkin, on the other 
hand, sees the problem that both law and democracy address and the solution 
they seek to provide in very diff erent terms. His answer is eff ectively to deny that 
legitimate authority, properly understood, really does involve one person telling 
another what to do. Rather, it involves people creating law for themselves. Th e 
problem that law and democracy face on this view is therefore completely diff erent, 
and is best described as primarily motivational. Eff orts at self-government require 
that people be engaged in politics, and so the primary task of law is to encourage 
political participation.60
58. It is in this sense (and in this sense only) that Dworkin’s account is consequentialist. See 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 26 at 187-90. Dworkin does not support his claims 
with any empirical evidence, and the data available on the level of public familiarity with 
Supreme Court decisions do not seem to support his views. See Th omas R Marshall, Public 
Opinion and the Supreme Court (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989) at 142-45; Herbert M 
Kritzer, “Th e Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme 
Court” (2001) 85:1 Judicature 32; Nathaniel Persily, “Introduction” in Nathaniel Persily, 
Jack Citrin & Patrick J Egan, eds, Public Opinion and Constitutional Controversy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008) 3 at 8 (summarizing empirical fi ndings suggesting “that in 
the vast majority of the cases reviewed here, Supreme Court decisions had no eff ect on the 
overall distribution of public opinion”).
59. Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note 22 at 344 [emphasis omitted]; see also Dworkin, 
Hedgehogs, supra note 4 at 398-99.
60. Against this background it is not diffi  cult to understand why Bentham had a very negative 
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Notice that my argument points to similarity in the arguments used in both 
domains; it is not that if one is a legal positivist then one is logically committed to 
the epistemic conception of democracy. Th erefore, while the similarity of views 
on law and democracy in the work of the legal positivists considered above is not 
surprising, it is not a challenge to my view to show that some legal positivists 
have embraced other justifi cations for democracy. Notice also that the argument 
here need not presuppose global doubts about conceptual jurisprudence. Even 
assuming there are valid conceptual questions in jurisprudence, if my analogical 
argument is convincing, it shows that the debates between legal positivists (or 
more precisely, the legal positivists whose views I considered) and Dworkin do 
not belong to the conceptual part of jurisprudence. 
How can a defender of conceptual jurisprudence avoid this challenge? Recall 
the argument outline presented at the outset:
1. Most legal positivists claim that many jurisprudential debates 
are conceptual;
2. Debates about the justification of democracy are normative, 
not conceptual;
3. Th e debates between legal positivists and Dworkin in jurisprudence 
are very similar in structure and content to debates on the justifi cation 
of democracy; and hence
4. It is very likely that, contrary to (1), debates between legal positivists 
and Dworkin are really normative.
To reject the argument, a defender of conceptual jurisprudence could 
either challenge any of the premises or argue that the conclusion does not follow 
even if all premises are true. Let us consider these possibilities briefl y. Is (1) true? 
It might be argued that many conceptualists allow for some epistemic values 
in their account of jurisprudence. Th at is indeed true,61 but it is irrelevant for 
present purposes, since virtually all these theorists insist that such questions are 
required for the sake of conceptual jurisprudence.62 I have little to say about (2). 
attitude towards common law courts (they provide poor guidance) while, especially late in 
his life, having a very favourable view of majoritarian institutions (they are good means for 
gathering information and at conveying it clearly through legislation). Likewise, it is not 
surprising that Dworkin holds the exact opposite views (courts are good at getting people 
engaged; political institutions, at least as currently structured in the United States, much less 
so).
61. For a list of defenders of this view, see Danny Priel, “Trouble for Legal Positivism?” (2006) 
12:3 Legal Th eory 225 at 226, n 1. Th at article shows that this puts legal positivists in a bind.
62. See the sources cited in supra notes 1-2.
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Without getting into the question of whether there are any signifi cant conceptual 
questions about the nature of democracy, notice that the debates I consider are 
not meant to answer the question “what is democracy?” Rather, they are competing 
answers to the question of democracy’s justifi cation. I cannot see how this is not a 
normative question. Premise (3) is, of course, the core of my argument, so I cannot 
here do more than refer readers to my argument in Part I(A), above, which aimed 
to show the similarity between the two debates. 
By far the most important challenge is that the conclusion does not follow 
from the premises. One version of this response, one that is logically correct but 
insignifi cant in this context, is to abandon (2) instead of (1), that is to adopt the 
view that arguments on democracy are also conceptual. While possible, I fi nd 
this possibility as unlikely as the rejection of (2) in the fi rst place, because the 
arguments in the context of democracy are so concerned with the question of 
justifi cation. I think a more convincing version of the claim that (4) does not 
follow from the premises is one that off ers a positive explanation why, despite 
appearances, jurisprudential debates are conceptual, and democracy debates 
are normative. 
Admittedly, this possibility cannot be ruled out, but the analogical argument 
presented above is meant to shift the burden to defenders of conceptual jurisprudence 
to explain why they insist, despite this similarity, that the jurisprudential debate is 
conceptual. I am not familiar with an argument to that eff ect. Th e only challenge 
I can think of is that unlike in the debate on democracy, the jurisprudential debate 
is one in which we are presented with two conceptual stories on the nature of law, 
one of which happens to be true while the other is false. Th ough possible, there 
are several reasons to doubt this claim. First and least important, the claim would 
be more convincing if positivists were able to show that one side (presumably 
theirs) is correct and the other is not. It is true that legal positivists sometimes 
triumphantly speak as though legal positivism is the only game in town, 63 but reality 
is rather diff erent. Debates between legal positivists and their many critics are 
ongoing. As I see it, whatever victory legal positivists have managed to declare has 
only been by reducing their theory to triviality. Th e more dramatic, and arguably 
more important, failure of legal positivism lies not with fellow legal philosophers, 
but—especially—with non-philosophers. For it is a fact (sometimes admitted 
63. See e.g. Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and 
Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 2 [Leiter, 
Naturalizing Jurisprudence] (“legal positivism stands as victorious as any research program in 
post-World War II philosophy”).
(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL380
in hushed tones and explained as the result of misunderstanding) 64 that outside 
the insular world of legal philosophy, legal positivism is not a widely-held view. 
Second, even if it is proven to everyone’s satisfaction that, for example, 
Dworkin’s theory of law does not refl ect what law actually is in the world today, 
this does not show that he does not off er a conceptually possible model of law. 
Imagine that we created a new society and made its political institutions conform 
as closely as possible to Dworkinian ideas.65 Would the result be a system of law? 
Legal positivists would argue that the answer is no, but Dworkin would insist, 
of course, that it is yes. Is there anything either side could argue to convince 
the other it is wrong? Not without circularity. Imagine, for example, that legal 
positivists assert that these Dworkin-inspired institutions, whatever they are, are 
not law because they do not claim authority by off ering exclusionary reasons for 
action; that is, because they don’t have the structure of law as defended by legal 
positivists. Dworkin’s obvious response would be to argue that this shows only 
that this supposed feature of law is mistaken, because here we have an instance 
of law—the one created in our imaginary society—that does not conform to the 
positivist characterization. To both present an articulation of what law is and 
then rely on it when considering a contested case is the fallacy of assuming the 
consequent. 66 To avoid arguing in this circular fashion, one would have to appeal 
to normative considerations that explain why the form of potential legitimacy it 
presupposes is the only justifi ed one. 
A third way to challenge my argument is to insist that Dworkin’s account, 
if realized, would yield something that is not law, because the result does 
not correspond to what we mean when we talk about law.67 That, however, 
would be an empirical claim about linguistic usage (only without empirical 
evidence to support it). And making such claims will turn these challengers’ 
64. See e.g. Anthony J Sebok, “Misunderstanding Positivism” (1995) 93:7 Mich L Rev 2054; 
Gardner, supra note 2 at 202-04; cf Brian Leiter, “Th e End of Empire: Dworkin and 
Jurisprudence in the 21st Century” (2004) 36:1 Rutgers LJ 165 at 166.
65. If you think no human society could exist with such laws, we can imagine a society made by 
non-humans; after all, conceptualists have insisted that a conceptual theory of law should 
be applicable for humans and non-humans alike. See e.g. Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and 
Norms, 2d ed (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) at 159-60; Shapiro, Legality, 
supra note 9 at 416-17, n 16. Th is is very diff erent from the critique that Dworkin’s account 
cannot be realized in human societies, because people actually do not take much interest 
in the courts. See supra note 56. Somewhat surprisingly given his views on conceptual 
jurisprudence, this seems to be Shapiro’s critique of Dworkin. See supra note 22.
66. I have previously developed this argument in more detail. See Danny Priel, “Jurisprudence 
and Necessity” (2007) 20:1 Can JL & Jur 173 [Priel, “Jurisprudence”].
67. Cf Shapiro, Legality, supra note 9, at 330-31.
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conceptual claims into linguistic ones; this is exactly what legal philosophers 
insist they are not doing.
II. THE CONTINUITY OF GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE AND 
LEGAL PRACTICE
In Part I, above, I have argued that the positivist account of the nature of law 
assumes that law’s function is guidance. Th is view assumes that law is justifi ed 
either when it provides information that most humans do not possess or when it 
aids individuals in dealing with coordination problems, and that this presupposes a 
more general claim about what potentially makes law legitimate. At a deeper level, 
this view is grounded in an interpretation of the relationship between individual 
citizens and the law. I have shown that this view is not properly understood as a 
conceptual claim but rather as a controversial normative claim about the way the 
law works to help people solve problems in their lives. I have contrasted this view 
with the one defended by Dworkin, one that sees the law as primarily aimed not 
at providing solutions to private individuals but rather as providing them with 
the means for fi nding those solutions on their own, or at least as a joint eff ort of 
a political community. I have supported the claim that this disagreement is not a 
conceptual debate on the question of what law is, one in which one side is right 
and the other wrong, by analogizing this debate to debates on democratic theory. 
Does any of this matter? Th e purpose of this Part is to explain why this 
fi nding may have relevance beyond the narrow confi nes of analytic jurisprudence. 
One corollary of the conceptualist view of jurisprudence is a strong divide between 
accounts of the nature of law and most normative debates within law, from the 
narrowest disagreements on the appropriate scope of particular doctrines to 
broader questions such as competing views on interpretation, the level of deference 
of the judiciary to the executive, and so on. 68 At the foundation of this view 
68. See e.g. Marmor, Philosophy of Law, supra note 2 at 10. Marmor states:
[I]t would be presumptuous to claim that a philosophical understanding of 
the nature of law must be a prologue to any philosophical inquiry into the 
nature of particular legal domains. Many issues that interest philosophers in 
such domains as criminal law … are mostly moral issues … . As such, they do 
not really depend on any particular understanding of the general nature of law.
 See also HLA Hart, “Comment” in Ruth Gavison, ed, Issues in Contemporary Legal 
Philosophy: Th e Infl uence of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 35 at 36 (“there is 
a standing need for a form of legal theory … the perspective of which is not … what the law 
requires in particular cases”).
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is a distinction between observers and participants in legal practice, with legal 
philosophers limiting themselves to the observer’s perspective.69 Part I(B), above, 
provided some reasons for doubting this view. Th e purpose of this section is to 
elucidate this view with the aid of several examples. Not all these examples have 
a strong connection with the debates over democracy mentioned earlier; all of 
them, however, show the blurred boundaries between conceptual jurisprudence 
and legal practice, between ideas as to what law, supposedly as a conceptual matter, 
is, and certain views as to what legal practice should look like. 
A. THE RULE OF LAW 
In the vast academic literature on the rule of law, there is often discussion of 
what, if anything, “rule of law” actually means. 70 Conceptual legal philosophers 
typically insist on the importance of keeping discussions of the rule of law separate 
from discussions of the rule of good law. 71 From this perspective, thinkers as 
far apart as Hayek and Dworkin are thought to have committed the same error: 
Hayek was a libertarian, and so he argued that the rule of law is inconsistent with 
welfare provision; Dworkin is an egalitarian and so his discussion of the rule of 
law contains references to equality. By contrast, positivist accounts of the rule of 
law—Raz’s oft-cited account is a paradigmatic example—are conceptually purer 
and more informative, precisely because they keep law and good law apart.72 
This concern translates into a distinction between “thin” or “formal” 
conceptions of the rule of law and “thick” or “substantive” ones,73 with conceptual 
69. See Raz, Between Authority, supra note 1 at 81-82, 85 (contrasting the view that “assumes 
that legal philosophy creates the concept of law” with the “fact [that] it merely explains the 
concept that exists independently of it.”); cf Marmor, Philosophy of Law, supra note 2 at 55 
(“[Hart’s] point is to show that there is nothing amiss about explaining the normativity of a 
system of rules from the outside”).
70. Cf Judith Shklar, “Political Th eory and the Rule of Law” in Allan C Hutchinson & Patrick 
Monahan, eds, Th e Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 1 at 1 (“the 
phrase ‘the Rule of Law’ has become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general 
over-use”). Shklar attempts to resurrect the expression by rescuing it from the “political 
vacuum” in which it is found by recovering the “political objectives” it had once stood for 
(ibid).
71. See Raz, Authority of Law, supra note 1 at 211. 
72. See ibid. In fairness, when discussing those who confuse the rule of law with the rule of good 
law, Raz does not mention Dworkin. (Dworkin’s essay on the rule of law cited in supra note 
20 was written after Raz’s piece.) However, Dworkin’s view has been challenged on these 
grounds. See Margaret Jane Radin, “Reconsidering the Rule of Law” (1989) 69:4 BUL Rev 
781 at 783-84, n 10. 
73. See e.g. Brian Z Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Th eory (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 91-113; Paul Craig, “Formal and Substantive 
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legal positivists invariably residing on the thinner edge of this divide. Our earlier 
discussion, however, helps to show why this is an inaccurate characterization 
of the debate and helps us better understand Raz’s assertions. Raz claims to be 
engaged in conceptual analysis of the rule of law and seeks to off er an account of 
the rule of law based on what he takes to be a conceptual claim about law and 
guidance. Remove law’s capacity to guide and you no longer have law. As Raz 
puts it, “[T]he law must be capable of being obeyed. … Th erefore, if the law is to 
be obeyed it must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects.”74 It is for this 
reason that a putative law that simply tells one to behave morally is ipso facto not 
law, because it does not provide additional guidance beyond that provided by morality 
itself. And yet, here and there Raz concedes that these ideas of guidance are tied 
to moral values, in particular that of autonomy, and that the sort of features 
we typically associate with the rule of law are a guarantee of people’s autonomy, 
which he claims “depends on the existence of stable, secure frameworks for one’s 
life and actions.”75 Th ese frameworks, in turn, can be promoted by maintaining the 
rule of law because of its capacity to help make the law “a stable and safe basis for 
individual planning.”76 Th is view is grounded in a particular (not uncontroversial) 
version of autonomy, a view that Raz developed later in much greater detail in a 
work he admitted was not primarily concerned with conceptual analysis.77 One 
implication of this view, already alluded to above, is that to the extent that 
morality is kept out of the law, this is so for moral reasons.
While positivist accounts of the rule of law often ignore its normative 
foundations, so-called substantive theories of the rule of law are sometimes 
thought to suff er from the opposite problem. Such accounts, we are told, confuse 
the rule of law with the substantive aims of the law, thus blurring the distinction 
between the rule of law and the rule of good law. At least as far as Dworkin is 
concerned, this accusation is unfounded. Th ough Dworkin does not present it in 
Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework” [1997] PL 467; Mark Ellis, 
“Toward a Common Ground Defi nition of the Rule of Law Incorporating Substantive 
Principles of Justice” (2010) 72:2 U Pitt L Rev 191 at 192-99.
74. Authority of Law, supra note 1 at 213-14 [emphasis in original].
75. Ibid at 220.
76. Ibid. It is true that Raz argues that this link does not establish a necessary connection 
between law and morality. See ibid at 223-25. But this claim, whether true or not, bears little 
on the issue considered here.
77. See Raz, Morality of Freedom, supra note 10 at 16. Th is liberal conception of freedom is very 
diff erent from the more republican notion of freedom that motivates Dworkin’s work. See 
Dworkin, Hedgehogs, supra note 4 at 365 (arguing in favour of a view of liberty according 
to which “people must be permitted to play a role in their own coercive governance: that 
government must in some sense or another be self-government” [emphasis in original]).
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exactly this way, the fundamental issue that concerns him in his discussion of the 
rule of law is its very possibility—the possibility of law that rules in the sense that 
it imposes binding obligations on those subject to it—especially against the claim 
that judges engage in moral and political reasoning when determining what the 
law requires. Th is is not a serious concern for those who deny this last point, but 
Dworkin, who accepts it, must off er a diff erent response. Specifi cally, he must 
demonstrate two things: Th e fi rst is that law has determinate “objective” content, 
and the second is that this content is “objectively” right. It is for this reason that 
Dworkin invokes political values in his account of the rule of law. To know what 
the law is, to know what it requires, calls for engagement in political argument, 
and especially equal concern and respect. Whether or not one accepts his 
substantive arguments, Dworkin’s appeal to political values as part of his account 
of the rule of law is not the result of his failure to understand the distinction 
between law and good law.
B. LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
A similar analysis to the one in Part II(A), above, shows that parallel political 
concerns underlie competing theories of legal interpretation. Law for Dworkin 
is thoroughly interpretive because deciding legal questions is a political act; one 
generates the right answers to political questions through a process of what he 
calls “constructive interpretation,”78 with courts of law being the paradigmatic 
forum for generating those answers. 
Much can be said about constructive interpretation, but here I will stress only 
a few points that bear directly on my argument about the relationship between 
Dworkin’s opinion on the fundamental point of law—the encouragement of 
political participation and the inculcation of the view of individuals as bearers of 
rights and duties—and his approach to interpretation. Th e connection is diffi  cult 
to miss. For Dworkin, true legal propositions are the conclusion of engagement 
with the entire political history of a given jurisdiction. One could consider that 
this approach to legal interpretation encourages lawyers to see themselves as 
participants in a conversation. Th is conversation involves other members of their 
polity, past and present (and perhaps also future), and is about the right way of 
dealing with a legal problem. In such a view, the original intentions of those who 
enacted the laws are part of that discussion but in no way control what the law 
requires. Th e fundamental diffi  culty with the view that gives primacy to original 
78.  Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 23 at 52.
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intentions is not merely the epistemic problems of ascertaining with suffi  cient 
certainty the intentions of a multi-member body (although this is certainly a 
problem that Dworkin discusses at some length); it is that an approach that gives 
authority to original interpretations is at its core non-participatory, even anti-
participatory. It encourages the view that laws are edicts that some create for 
others to follow, rather than the view that laws constitute an endless process of 
rediscovery and recreation of values by the entire political community, which, as 
we have seen, Dworkin takes to be the fundamental point of democracy.79
All this has been rejected by legal positivists, and yet to the extent that they 
do write on interpretation, one fi nds in some positivists’ work ideas that tie what 
law is with what interpretation should look like. My example comes from the 
work of Marmor, who has written extensively on interpretation and adjudication 
from a positivist standpoint. I focus here on his claim that certain views about 
what law is have particular normative implications about the appropriate 
approach to statutory interpretation. Marmor bases his argument on the view 
that “the justifi cation of deference to legislative intent must be derived from 
the conditions which can be taken to establish that one person should be 
acknowledged to have authority over another.”80 What this means in practice, says 
Marmor, is that judges should attempt to identify and follow legislative intention.
Marmor’s position is a rather weak one, for he clearly thinks that some 
laws cannot be justifi ed by the notion of expertise. Nonetheless, to the extent 
this is possible, this implies that judges should try to identify the intention 
of the lawmakers. Marmor’s view is thus a clear illustration of a positivist linkage 
between the justifi cation for law (law is justifi ed by being a kind of knowledgeable 
service provider), a “conceptual” claim about the nature of law (guidance of conduct 
as a fundamental feature of law), and a normative claim about the right ap-
proach to the interpretation of legal texts (intentionalism). But if I am right 
in my argument so far, then the allegedly conceptual step in this linkage is in 
fact a particular characterization of law that is grounded in highlighting certain 
political values (above all a particular view of autonomy and its relationship to 
guidance) over others (especially one that ties freedom to political participation). 
79. See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 26 at 364-65, 372; see also Dworkin, Freedom’s 
Law, supra note 22 at 15-31.
80. Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Th eory, 2d ed (Oxford: Hart, 2005) at 134. For an 
endorsement of this view see Raz, Between Authority, supra note 1 at 291, nn 26-27. Th ere is 
an obvious connection between this view and the one mentioned in text accompanying supra 
note 41.
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C. DISSENT, CIVIL AND JUDICIAL
Th e examples in Part II(A-B), above, were closely tied to questions that often 
fi gure in jurisprudential debates. My intention there has been to show that we 
can make better sense of the works of theorists on both sides of the positivist/
anti-positivist divide by recognizing their approaches’ political underpinnings. 
In this section I make a slightly diff erent point. I wish to show that the similarity 
between debates in jurisprudence and among political theorists about the 
justifi cation of democracy help us better understand other familiar aspects of law. 
My chosen example is dissent, a phenomenon found in somewhat diff erent forms 
in both law and democracy. 81 I will argue that there are two very diff erent 
ways of understanding the role of dissent that correspond to the two competing 
models of law and democracy described in Part I, above. On one understanding, 
the purpose of dissent is to provide information about a diff erent possible legal 
analysis; on the other, the point of dissent is to give the dissenting judge a chance 
to participate and express an opinion on a public matter.
Th e more interesting point to note is how the two models of law and democracy 
described above lead to diff erent understandings of dissent. Consider fi rst political 
dissent. When legal positivist Raz explains why there is no general obligation 
to obey the law, his explanation is, at bottom, closely tied to his view about the 
centrality of guidance towards right action, which gives law its authority in the 
fi rst place. Th ere is no obligation to obey the law if, for whatever reason, the edict 
provided by the law fails in fact to guide to the correct action,82 or when the person 
subject to the law is an expert on the matter, and thus cannot be guided by the 
law.83 Th e basis for civil dissent here, then, is fundamentally epistemic: Th e law 
81. It is not uncommon to draw links between judicial and political dissent. See e.g. Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 14 at 210-12; William O Douglas, “Th e Dissent: A 
Safeguard of Democracy” (1948) 32:4 J Am Judicature Soc’y 104 at 105. Douglas observes:
 One cannot imagine the courts of Hitler engaged in a public debate over the principles of 
Der Feuhrer [sic], with a minority of one or four deploring or denouncing the principles 
themselves. One cannot imagine a judge of a Communist court dissenting against the 
decrees of the Kremlin. 
 See also Cass R Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2003) at 66, 176-78.
82. Raz, Authority of Law, supra note 1 at 247-48. 
83. Raz, Ethics, supra note 8 at 348 (“if I am the greatest living expert on pharmaceuticals, then 
the law has no authority over me regarding the safety of pharmaceuticals”); but see Dworkin, 
Principle, supra note 20 at 105-06.
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does not have authority over me when in a given situation I know better than the 
law (or the lawmakers) what the right course of action is. 
Dworkin’s explanation is very diff erent. For him, the justifi cation for civil 
disobedience comes from recognizing that the fundamental point of law is the 
obligation of every citizen to decide what she has to do: “A citizen’s allegiance is to 
the law, not to any particular person’s view of what the law is … .”84 Consequently, 
at least when the law is uncertain, citizens fulfi ll their obligation to the law by 
following what they themselves think is the correct interpretation of the law. In 
this way “the development and testing of the law through experimentation by 
citizens … [is] pursue[d] … by inviting citizens to decide the strengths and 
weaknesses of legal arguments for themselves … and to act on these judgments 
… .”85 Civil disobedience is just a special case of Dworkin’s concern with 
participation and engagement with the law. 
How do these views relate to judicial dissent? Interestingly, when we look 
closely at the practice of judicial dissent, we can identify diff erent attitudes to it 
that refl ect the diff erent conceptions of law and democracy and the role of civil 
disobedience in them. Yet because of the institutional diff erences between 
individuals and judges, these conceptions play out somewhat diff erently. Th e 
notion of dissent that is parallel to the epistemic model of democracy is what 
we might call “informational dissent.” Th e justifi cation for this dissent is that it 
provides a diff erent opinion as to what the correct reading of the law should be. 
Its aim is to point out and leave a record for what the dissenter thinks is a mistake 
in the hope that in the future this information will lead to a change in the law. In 
the extreme case, this informational dissent would not really be a dissent at all: 
Judges would voice their disagreement with the majority’s view in internal discussion 
with their colleagues in the hope of persuading them to change their mind. But 
once the information has been provided and it becomes evident that it has failed 
to convince, the judges would withdraw their dissent and join the court. We are 
told, for example, that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was reluctant “to express 
his dissent, once he’s ‘had his say’ on a given subject ... .” 86 
84. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 14 at 214.
85. Ibid at 216-17; cf Dworkin, Principle, supra note 20 at 111 (preferring “persuasive strategies” 
of civil disobedience as more consistent with democracy).
86. Melvin I Urofsky, “Th e Brandeis–Frankfurter Conversations” [1985] Sup Ct Rev 299 at 
330. Holmes was known as the Great Dissenter, but in fact he did not dissent often. See 
Th omas C Grey, “Molecular Motions: Th e Holmesian Judge in Th eory and Practice” (1995) 
37 Wm & Mary L Rev 19 at 27-28. As Holmes once put it, “[I]t [is] useless and undesirable, 
as a rule, to express dissent … .” Northern Securities Co v United States, 193 US 197 at 400 
(1904), 24 S Ct 436 (Holmes J, dissenting). Holmes was by no means alone in this view. In 
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Informational dissent of this kind might be understood along the Rousseauian 
lines described above, as judges concluding from their dissenting position that 
they had been mistaken. Perhaps belonging to this group are also cases in which 
judges indicate they were unsure about the outcome, but decided to follow the 
opinion of other members of the court they considered more knowledgeable in 
the area of law in question. 87 Th ough such open admissions are less common 
today, they may still exist where a judge’s expertise in a particular area of law infl uences 
other judges into concurrence.88 Slightly less pure cases are those in which judges 
make it clear in their decision that they still disagreed with the court’s conclusion, 
but considered it pointless to actually dissent once they expressed their view to 
their colleagues and realized it was not shared by a majority. 89 A rather similar 
compromise is found in cases of bare, unreasoned dissent, which, though less 
common today than in the past, can still occasionally be found.90 
A feature of these cases is that they in fact do not provide information to the 
general public, or even to the smaller audience of lawyers. Th is refl ects a starkly 
non-participatory view of law. Law, on this view, is not something for people to 
engage in, but is rather a matter for a wise elite to decide in closed chambers. 
fact, such practices were prevalent in the United States Supreme Court in the past. See Lee 
Epstein, Jeff rey A Segal & Harold J Spaeth, “Th e Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme 
Court” (2001) 45:2 Am J Pol Sci 362; Robert Post, “Th e Supreme Court as Institutional 
Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court” (2001) 85:5 
Minn L Rev 1267 at 1331-50.
87. Th is, no doubt, is a phenomenon that occurs more frequently than we have evidence for, as 
judges can simply silently concur to the view of a judge considered an expert in a particular 
area. But at times judges reveal their reservations about the outcome for which they voted 
and admit that they were persuaded to follow the view of a judge whom they considered an 
expert on the topic. See e.g. Alan Paterson, Th e Law Lords (London, UK: Macmillan, 1982) 
at 120-21 (members of the House of Lords admitting, in interviews, deference to other 
judges they considered experts). 
88. Th ere is empirical evidence suggesting that judges tend to develop expertise areas and that 
others are more likely to follow them in areas in which they are considered experts. See Saul 
Brenner, “Issue Specialization as a Variable in Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme 
Court” (1984) 46:4 J Pol 1217 (providing empirical evidence for issue specialization in 
the civil rights cases of the Warren Court); see also Edward K Cheng, “Th e Myth of the 
Generalist Judge” (2008) 61:3 Stan L Rev 519 at 543, 549, passim (providing empirical 
evidence of specialization among circuit judges, often in areas in which they have recognized 
previous experience).
89. Such practice exists in both the US Supreme Court and the House of Lords. For examples, 
see Louis Blom-Cooper & Gavin Drewry, Final Appeal: A Study of the House of Lords in Its 
Judicial Capacity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) at 86, n 1.
90. See e.g. Minnesota v Olson, 495 US 91 (1990), 110 S Ct 1684 (Rehnquist CJ and Blackmun 
J, dissenting).
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What is also important is that such secret (or even non-existent) dissents may be 
preferable from the perspective of law’s guidance function, as they minimize the 
fragmentation and uncertainty that dissents often introduce into the law. 91 
Th e most revealing examples of informational dissent are found in published 
and reasoned one-time dissents. In these instances, a judge who disagrees with a 
majority on the correct outcome of the case dissents to explain why the majority’s 
decision is mistaken, hoping in this way to convince a future court, or the legislature, 
to change the legal rule the majority establishes. 92 In this form of dissent, when 
a similar case comes before the court again, the dissenter joins the majority. 
A clear example of this approach is found in the following passage from Knuller 
(Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions.93 In the 
course of concurring with the majority, Lord Reid discussed his dissent in an earlier 
decision, Shaw v Director of Public Prosecutions:94 
I dissented in Shaw’s case. On reconsideration I still think that the decision was 
wrong and I see no reason to alter anything which I said in my speech. But it does 
not follow that I should now support a motion to reconsider the decision. I have 
said more than once in recent cases that our change of practice in no longer 
regarding previous decisions of this House as absolutely binding does not mean that 
whenever we think that a previous decision was wrong we should reverse it. In the 
general interest of certainty in the law we must be sure that there is some very good 
reason before we so act. 95
91. See Blom-Cooper & Drewry, supra note 89 at 87. For comparison, consider the French 
judicial habit of having unpublished detailed discussion of the relevant issues alongside 
the brief and dissent-free published opinion. See Mitchel de S-O-l’E Lasser, Judicial 
Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004) at 47-60; Michael Wells, “French and American Judicial 
Opinions” (1994) 19:1 Yale J Int’l L 81 at 113-14. Relatedly, a court may try to reduce the 
number of concurring judgments to a single opinion of the court. Chief Justice Marshall 
innovated this practice in the US Supreme Court, which has managed to maintain judicial 
decisions with little or no dissents. See Del Dickson, ed, Th e Supreme Court in Conference 
(1940-1985): Th e Private Discussions Behind Nearly 300 Supreme Court Decisions (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001) at 28, 32-33, 39-40; cf Sonja R West, “Concurring in Part & 
Concurring in the Confusion” (2006) 104:8 Mich L Rev 1951 (demonstrating the doctrinal 
diffi  culties emerging from multiple concurring opinions).
92. See Benjamin N Cardozo, Law and Literature and Other Essays and Addresses (New York: 
Harcourt Brace, 1931) at 36 (“Th e dissenter speaks to the future, and his voice is pitched to a 
key that will carry through the years”).
93. [1973] AC 435, [1972] 2 All ER 898 (HL) [Knuller].
94. [1962] AC 220, [1961] 2 All ER 446 (HL).
95. Knuller, supra note 93 at 455. It must be mentioned in this context that Reid recognized the 
informational value of separate opinions and dissents. He has, in fact, criticized the practice 
of publishing a single joint opinion and argued that it tends to produce “inferior” decisions. 
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Justice Holmes acted in a similar fashion in State of Washington v WC Dawson 
& Co, where he fi led a brief concurring opinion only to note that 
[t]he reasoning of Southern Pacifi c Co. v. Jensen … , and cases following it, never has 
satisfi ed me and therefore I should have been glad to see a limit set to the principle. 
But I must leave it to those who think the principle right to say how far it extends. 96 
On the informational view of dissent, once the information has been provided, 
there is no point in dissenting again and repeating the reasons given in the earlier 
decisions. While no doubt there may be some value in repeating a view in order 
to make sure it is disseminated, competing considerations militate against 
repeated dissents. Repeated dissents have the potential for greater animosity 
among members of a court and may harm both the working environment in 
the court and public perceptions of the law.97 More important for our purposes, 
considerations of clarity, certainty, and effi  ciency  clearly discourage dissent:98 
Dissents usually lead to longer and more convoluted judicial decisions, ones that 
are addled by qualifi cations, responses, and rejoinders. Th ey tend to encourage 
the view that the law is a matter of personal opinion and depends merely on the 
identity of those who hear the case (a particularly acute problem in courts sitting 
See Lord Reid, “Th e Judge as Law Maker” (1972) 12:1 J Soc’y Pub Tchrs L (ns) 22 at 29. 
Th is is a clear indication that he understood the value of dissent in epistemic terms.
96. 264 US 219 at 228 (1924), 44 S Ct 302 [citation omitted] (Holmes J, concurring). Holmes 
dissented in Southern Pacifi c Co v Jensen, 244 US 205 (1917), 37 S Ct 524. Holmes has 
behaved similarly elsewhere. For examples see Post, supra note 86, at 1349-50, nn 254-56. 
To the extent that the informational dissent refl ects a view of law that is more prevalent in 
Britain, it is interesting that Post comments that Holmes was “the Justice most infl uenced 
by English conceptions of the nature of opinion-writing” (ibid at 1289); cf Neil Duxbury, 
“When Trying is Failing: Holmes’s ‘Englishness’” (1997) 63:1 Brook L Rev 145 at 151, 
154-55. However, Holmes is not alone in taking such a stance to dissent. See e.g. Georgia 
v McCollum, 505 US 42 at 59-60 (1992), 112 S Ct 2348 (Rehnquist CJ, concurring) (“I 
was in dissent in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. … and continue to believe that case to 
have been wrongly decided. But so long as it remains the law, I believe that it controls the 
disposition of this case …” citing Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co, 500 US 614 (1991), 
111 S Ct 2077); Baze v Rees, 553 US 35 at 87 (2008), 128 S Ct 1520 (Stevens J, concurring 
in the judgment). Additional examples are mentioned in Allison Orr Larsen, “Perpetual 
Dissents” (2008) 15:2 Geo Mason L Rev 447 at 452-53.
97. Th is was denied in Antonin Scalia, “Dissenting Opinions” (1994) 19:1 J Sup Ct Hist 33 
at 40-41. Others, however, have suggested that Scalia’s acerbic dissents have alienated some 
of his colleagues and may have weakened the conservative bloc on the Supreme Court. See 
Mark V Tushnet, A Court Divided: Th e Rehnquist Court and the Future of Constitutional Law 
(New York: WW Norton & Company, 2005) at 65.
98. Cf Wells, supra note 91 at 110-13 (arguing that the short French judicial decisions may be 
no worse than discursive common law decisions that contain numerous and often confl icting 
opinions); Lasser, supra note 91 at 328-30.
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in panels), and, especially if the dissent is powerful, they leave open the possibility 
that the law will be modifi ed in the future, thus undermining its certainty. To 
anyone who thinks that the most fundamental point of the law is its ability to 
guide conduct, repeated and frequent dissents are clearly undesirable.
It is not diffi  cult to see the similarity between this view of judicial dissent and 
epistemic models of democracy, as well as the connection between such ideas and 
a particular view on the value of free speech. Dissent, both political and judicial, 
is valuable because it challenges received opinions and can in this way improve 
the quality of decisions. 99 Both legal and democratic dissents provide information 
and thus contribute to a more robust “marketplace of ideas.” 100 To be sure, 
even on this view, there may be some benefi t in repeating an idea, but this 
benefi t signifi cantly declines once it is clear the idea is known.101
A completely diff erent attitude to dissent is revealed in what may be termed 
persistent or repeated dissents. During their tenure on the United States Supreme 
99. Cf John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty” in John Gray, ed, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991) 1 at 59 (explaining the value of false speech in “vigorously 
and earnestly contest[ing]” the truth and thus preventing it from being “held in a manner 
of a prejudice” and that there is value for truth to come to contest with falsehood). On 
the salutary eff ects of dissent, see generally Sunstein, supra note 81. Among other things, 
Sunstein summarizes empirical studies showing how dissent can break herd thinking. See 
Sunstein, supra note 81 at 66-72; see also Krishna K Ladha, “Th e Condorcet Jury Th eorem, 
Free Speech, and Correlated Votes” (1992) 36:3 Am J Pol Sci 617.
100. See Abrams et al v US, 250 US 616 at 630 (1919), 40 S Ct 17 (Holmes J, dissenting) (“[T]he 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.”). Th is is, ironically, one of the few areas in which Holmes repeated his dissent. See 
Gitlow v People of the State of New York, 268 US 652 at 673 (1925), 45 S Ct 625 (Holmes J, 
dissenting) (“If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined 
to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech 
is that they should be given their chance and have their way”). Given what I have said here, 
it should not come as a surprise that in illustrating his view on civil disobedience Dworkin 
mentions this case of repeated judicial dissent by Justice Holmes, which fi ts his view of law. 
See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 14 at 211. Dworkin does not mention the 
more numerous cases in which Holmes did not repeat a dissent. For more on such cases, see 
supra note 86.
101. Does Raz’s view not show that when judges consider themselves legal experts on an issue, 
they should continue dissenting, because law does not have authority over them? I think not. 
In addition to the reasons discussed in the text about the value of clarity for the guidance 
function of law, there is the point that judges are not required to act on their view of the law; 
they are off ering an interpretation of what the law is. Leaving aside institutional constraints, 
Raz’s view would suggest not so much continued dissent, but that judges should disregard the 
law in their private capacity.
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Court, Justices Brennan and Marshall have repeatedly dissented from decisions 
not to grant certiorari on appeals relating to the constitutionality of the death 
penalty. Th e reason was their view “that the death penalty is in all circumstances 
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
… .” 102 Brennan and Marshall are perhaps extreme but by no means alone in 
this respect.103 As I said earlier, there may be a limited justifi cation for repeated 
dissents even on the informational model of dissent. But such dissents often 
refl ect a completely diff erent attitude, one that the informational model completely 
fails to capture. 104 On this view the purpose of dissent is to provide “a legitimate 
means of protest against opinions which are, at the moment, in the majority. It 
helps to refl ect the diversity of contemporary society, of which a diverse judiciary 
is but a muted refl ection.”105 Such a view would challenge the idea that dissents 
provide information or are likely to convince anyone: Th e opposing view is 
almost always there anyway, and the incidents in which a powerful dissent can be 
said to have led to an eventual change in the law are rare. Under this approach, 
dissents are expressions of the dissenter’s understanding of what the law requires and 
their point is (self-)expression rather than persuasion. 
Th ese considerations are not eroded by repeated dissents; in fact, quite the 
opposite may be the case. Th e dissent on this view is not justifi ed by its benefi cial 
consequences but on its own terms, as an expression of one’s personal attempt 
at coming to terms with what the law requires. Even when repeated dissent 
is discussed in more consequentialist terms, the focus is on the value of debate 
102. See e.g. Pyles v Texas, 488 US 986 at 986 (1988), 109 S Ct 543. See also Michael Mello, 
Against the Death Penalty: Th e Relentless Dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1996) at 4 (“Brennan and Marshall issued such dissents in 
more than twenty-fi ve hundred cases … ”).
103. See Larsen, supra note 96 at 449, 453 (arguing that perpetual dissents are “more the norm 
these days, rather than the exception” and that this is the case for “every member of the 
Rehnquist Court”).
104. See William J Brennan, Jr, “In Defense of Dissents” (1986) 37:3 Hastings LJ 427 at 437 
(explaining that he had been concerned with “simply off er[ing] an alternative analysis – that 
could [have] be[en] done in a single dissent,” and that the repeated dissent “constitutes a 
statement by the judge as an individual”).
105.  Th e Hon Justice Michael Kirby, “On the Writing of Judgments” (1990) 64:11 Austl L J 
691 at 707 [footnotes omitted]; accord J Louis Campbell III, “Th e Spirit of Dissent” (1983) 
66:7 Judicature 305 at 306 (“Dissenting opinions function analogously to acts of civil 
disobedience in off ering protest and securing systemic change”); see also Mello, supra note 
102 at 155-56 (suggesting that repeated dissent is like an act of conscientious objection); 
cf Lani Guinier, “Th e Supreme Court 2007 Term – Foreword: Demosprudence Th rough 
Dissent” (2008) 122:1 Harv L Rev 4 at 47-52 (arguing for the role of dissenting opinions 
within democratic deliberation).
PRIEL, JURISPRUDENTIAL DEBATES 393
itself, not on the idea that additional dissents will get us closer to the truth. As 
repeated dissenter William Brennan put it, in terms very similar to Dworkin’s 
view of democracy, “We are a free and vital people because we not only allow, we 
encourage debate, and because we do not shut down communication as soon as 
a decision is reached. … So we debate and discuss and contend and always we 
argue. … Th e process enriches all of us … .”106 
Th ese views exhibit a completely diff erent attitude to the role of dissent and 
the signifi cance of free speech in a democracy, and more generally to the role of 
expressing one’s opinion on political matters. It is not, or not primarily, the hope 
of convincing others, but rather the hope of forming a polity where people’s 
rights are the subject of an ongoing political debate. Dworkin has claimed that 
“[w]e argue for our constitutional interpretations … knowing that others will 
inevitably reject our arguments … .”107 Nonetheless, he thinks that free speech 
is justifi ed as an affi  rmation of the idea of self-government, and for the sake of 
protecting people’s equality and ultimately the legitimacy of government.108 In 
this environment, political argument in courts and participatory “partnership” 
democracy are important for fostering this kind of debate. 
III. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR JURISPRUDENCE
So far my argument has sought to establish two points: fi rst, that what is presented 
as conceptual jurisprudence depends on political argument; and second, that 
this point has implications not just for competing arguments on the “nature” 
of law, but also for lower-level debates among lawyers, a fi nding that challenges 
the claim that there is a strict divide between general jurisprudence and various 
aspects of legal practice that are of interest to practicing lawyers. Th e purpose of 
this Part is to outline some potential implications of this view for the shape 
jurisprudence should take. Th e fi rst of its three sections addresses the relatively 
local question of the debate between legal positivists and anti-positivists and 
suggests in what way it might be reconceived in light of what I have said so far. 
Th e next section turns to the more general question of the relationship between 
law and democracy, and the fi nal section concludes with an even more general 
106. Brennan, supra note 104 at 437 [emphasis added].
107. Dworkin, Justice in Robes, supra note 3 at 127; accord Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra 
note 14 at 186.
108. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, supra note 26 at 365-66. Contrast this with his description of free 
speech in a majoritarian conception of democracy in which the purpose of free speech is to 
“inform” individuals “about their choices” (ibid at 358).
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proposal on the right way of thinking about competing jurisprudential theories. 
Inevitably, in the context of the present article, I present these ideas in fairly general 
and tentative terms.
A. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF LAW
Th e narrowest sense in which the discussion of Part I, above, helps us understand 
jurisprudence is that it helps us see what is at stake in the debates between legal 
positivists and anti-positivists, or, more precisely, between Hart’s version of legal 
positivism and Dworkin’s version of anti-positivism. Th ere is no shortage of 
suggested solutions to this dispute, but most of them seek to confi ne the debate 
to the law itself. Some claim legal positivism is a theory for explaining easy cases 
whereas Dworkin’s is a theory for deciding hard cases; 109 others argue that while 
Dworkin’s theory explains “much more accurately [than legal positivism] … 
appellate adjudication,” it is not clear whether his theory “characterizes the idea 
of law itself ”; 110 still others suggest that Dworkin’s account is a normative theory 
of adjudication true of one legal system whereas legal positivism is a descriptive 
theory true of law in general; 111 another suggestion is that a positivist account 
explains statutory law, whereas Dworkin’s theory is a better account of the common 
law;112 finally, it has been suggested that we can vindicate both views by 
distinguishing between the perspective of the citizen and that of the judge. 113 
109. Th is may be a plausible reading of some of Dworkin’s own remarks. See Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously, supra note 14 at 28. He states: 
 After [a diffi  cult lawsuit like Riggs v Palmer] is decided, we may say that the case 
stands for a particular rule … . But the rule does not exist before the case is decided; 
the court cites principles as its justifi cation for adopting and applying a new rule. 
 Dworkin describes a hard case as a case in which “no settled rule dictates a decision either 
way” (ibid at 83). See E Philip Soper, “Legal Th eory and the Obligation of a Judge: Th e 
Hart/Dworkin Dispute” (1977) 75:3 Mich L Rev 473 at 487-88 (arguing along these lines). 
But a careful reading shows that even in his earliest writings Dworkin rejected the view that 
the law is made up of both rules (dealing with easy cases) and principles (means for resolving 
hard cases). For an explicit discussion, see Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 23 at 266, 354. 
It is clear even in Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 14 at 38, 44, 76, 343-44. See 
also Timothy Endicott, “Are Th ere Any Rules?” (2001) 5:3 J Ethics 199 at 202-03 (providing 
textual support for this reading). 
110. Frederick Schauer, “Th e Jurisprudence of Reasons,” Book Review of Law’s Empire by Ronald 
Dworkin, (1987) 85:5-6 Mich L Rev 847 at 870. 
111. See Hart, Concept of Law, supra note 2 at 240-41; Kramer, supra note 8 at 152; Bayles, supra 
note 2 at 380.
112. Stephen R Perry, “Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law” (1987) 7:2 Oxford 
J Legal Stud 215 at 240-41, 256.
113. See John Eekelaar, “Judges and Citizens: Two Conceptions of Law” (2002) 22:3 Oxford J 
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Th e discussion in Part I, above, suggests that the ultimate explanation for the 
diff erence lies outside the law. In this section, however, I seek to point out one of 
this explanation’s implications for legal theory. For Hart, the building blocks of 
law are rules: “At fi rst sight it might seem that the statement that a legal system 
consists … of rules could hardly be doubted or found diffi  cult to understand.”114 
He goes on to show that this statement needs further explanation, but at no point 
does he ever challenge it. Indeed, when he presents his own view of law, he presents 
the essence of law as “the union of primary and secondary rules.”115 
Many legal positivists fi nd the idea that law is a matter of rules so obvious 
that they have been tempted to assume that Dworkin adopts something like 
this view with some modifi cations, specifi cally that he thinks of law as made up 
of rules understood in more or less the way positivists understand them, only 
coupled with principles.116 Surprising as it may sound—what else is law made 
up of, if not rules?—Dworkin rejects this view. He pretty much says this, at least 
with regard to judicial decisions, when he states that judges “cite reasons, in the 
form of precedents and principles, to justify a decision, but it is the decision, not 
some new and stated rule of law, that these precedents and principles are taken to 
justify.” 117 Elsewhere he explains it somewhat diff erently when he says that “[l]aw 
Legal Stud 497 at 508-13. 
114. Hart, Concept of Law, supra note 2 at 8 [emphasis in original]. 
115. Ibid at 79.
116. Two examples: (1) Marmor writes that “[l]egal rules, Dworkin claims, typically gain their 
validity by an act of enactment, more or less along the lines presumed by Hart and other 
positivists.” Marmor, Philosophy of Law, supra note 2 at 87. Th is has never been Dworkin’s 
view. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 14 at 38; see also Endicott, supra note 
109. (2) Raz has argued that Dworkin’s theory is conservative in that it assigns too much 
weight to precedent and analogy. See Joseph Raz, “Professor Dworkin’s Th eory of Rights,” 
Book Review of Taking Rights Seriously by Ronald Dworkin, (1978) 26:1 Pol Stud 123 at 
133-35. Similarly, Raz has criticized Dworkin for his “total faith in analogical arguments” 
and their supposed ability to fi nd right answers from earlier cases. See Raz, Authority of 
Law, supra note 1 at 205, n 19. Quite the contrary: Dworkin has no need for analogy, and 
does not give much weight to precedent. For Dworkin, every decision is ideally arrived at 
based on the totality of relevant facts that bear on the case, and past decisions are not treated 
as rules from which we fi nd the answer to new cases through analogy, but as sources for 
generating reasons that are balanced afresh in every new case. No wonder then that Dworkin 
is highly critical of analogical reasoning as a means for fi nding the right answer to legal or 
moral questions. See Dworkin, Justice in Robes, supra note 3 at 69-70; Ronald Dworkin, 
“Reply” (1997) 29:2 Ariz St LJ 431 at 455. Raz’s error stems from interpreting Dworkin’s 
theory through the lens of the Hartian model of rules. As such, he takes Dworkin to think 
that the right answer to every legal question can be found by looking at rules created by past 
precedents or by analogy from them. Th is, however, is the exact opposite of Dworkin’s view.
117. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 14 at 111; cf Arthur L Corbin, “Th e Law and 
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is not exhausted by any catalogue of rules or principles,” but rather is “defi ned by 
attitude … [that] must be pervasive in our ordinary lives … . It is a protestant 
attitude that makes each citizen responsible for imagining what his society’s public 
commitments to principle are … .” 118 Th is is a task that every individual has to 
accomplish, because “[a] citizen’s allegiance is to the law, not to any particular 
person’s view of what the law is,” 119 including the particular view of the judge. 
On this view, we can talk of law consisting of rules, but these rules have a 
completely diff erent meaning from their meaning in Hart’s account. Whenever 
a judge mentions a rule, it is equally an act of creation and declaration because 
such instances are always acts of making sense of (and giving sense to) the past. 
And thus, a declaration of a legal rule is always the conclusion of an argument, 
not a premise in it. Moreover, once a decision has been rendered, this rule will 
not become a premise in a future argument; it, too, will only serve as another fact 
that adds to the political history that is relevant for a novel creation of a legal rule 
that in some sense is true for one decision only. 120 
Th ese views of Hart and Dworkin directly confl ict,121 and they cannot be 
easily reconciled. Understood as conceptual claims, one of them necessarily must 
be false. Th eir fundamental diff erences become much less mysterious once we take 
into account the diff erent goals Hart and Dworkin assign to law, and the political 
theories that underlie them. Th eir diff erent views are competing interpretations of 
legal phenomena that are made in light of certain political theories, and they 
point to diff erent possibilities open to diff erent instantiations of law. Th ere is an 
obvious link between Hart’s view that law is about guidance and his view that 
the Judges” (1914) 3:2 Yale Rev (ns) 234 at 235-36, 246 (arguing that what one fi nds in the 
law reports are not rules but “arguments of learned and experienced men on both sides of 
vast numbers of questions”); Wells, supra note 91 at 109-10.
118. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 23 at 413. See also Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 
supra note 14 at 76 (“I want to oppose the idea that ‘the law’ is a fi xed set of standards of any 
sort”).
119. Ibid at 214. Contrast this with Hart’s description of “the relatively passive matter of the 
ordinary individual acquiescing in the rules by obeying them for his part alone.” Hart, 
Concept of Law, supra note 2 at 117.
120. In his report on his impressions of the United States, Hart comes close to articulating this 
view of the law. See HLA Hart, “A View of America” (1958) 59:1501 Th e Listener 89 at 90. 
He states:
 [M]any [Americans] have a passionate conviction that if you could throw off  the shackles 
of words and of legal rules and leave honest men to think out what on the whole was the 
best thing to do at every juncture of life, you would fi nd both great agreement and the 
best decision.
121. Compare Endicott, supra note 109 at 214-18, with Ronald Dworkin, “Replies to Endicott, 
Kamm, and Altman” (2001) 5:3 J Ethics 263 at 263-64. 
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rules are there to preclude argument on the one hand, and between Dworkin’s view 
that law is about political participation and his view that rules are conclusions of 
argument on the other. One aspect in which legal systems may diff er is the degree 
to which they are concerned with guidance as opposed to participation. 
Th e moment we understand the debate in this way, it takes a diff erent form: 
whether law is made up of rules—when asked not as an empirical question about 
a particular legal system but as an abstract general question—depends on what, 
at the most abstract level, we want law to do. Th is is not, primarily, a conceptual 
question. It is a question that depends to some extent on the particular legal and 
political tradition of a particular jurisdiction. As a philosophical question, it is 
primarily one of normative political theory. 
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC AND LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS AS A JURISPRUDENTIAL QUESTION
Apart from understanding existing debates and where they have gone astray, the 
argument I develop in this article should help us see how to move beyond them. 
In the current climate of contemporary legal philosophy, with its focus on 
conceptual inquiry, I believe the argument’s potential implications are signifi cant. 
Because these implications are of much greater scope than I can address in this 
article, I will limit my discussion in this section to the context in which I opened 
this article: the relationship between law and democracy. 
Let me begin by clarifying what my argument does not seek to show. First, I 
hope it is clear that I do not argue that if one holds a particular view on the 
justifi cation of democracy one has to be, at pain of inconsistency, a legal positivist, and 
that if one holds another, one must reject legal positivism. Suffi  ce it to say that 
similar political considerations aff ect one’s view on the appropriate understanding 
of what law and democracy are, based on certain political assumptions of what 
could justify them. 
Second, my argument is also not that either legal positivism or Dworkin’s 
view is better or worse suited to democracy. My argument is that we can 
understand the two competing normative approaches to both law and democracy 
as off ering two diff erent responses to the fundamental problems that law and 
democracy seek to solve, and perhaps more fundamentally, as off ering diff erent 
perspectives on the appropriate way of solving these problems. As I state earlier, 
one view perceives the primary problem that law and democracy strive to solve 
as primarily epistemic; the other perceives it as primarily motivational. Which 
kind of problem is more serious and what kinds of solutions are acceptable are 
questions that involve both empirical and normative elements. Abstractly, it is 
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perfectly possible to think that contemporary polities suff er, or potentially suff er, 
from both epistemic and motivational problems and to try to design political 
institutions with both problems in mind. One may wish to have, for example, 
a guidance conception of law as counterpoint to a participation conception of 
democracy, or vice versa. Th e dominance of the conceptual approach to jurisprudence 
has obscured all that and more: To the extent that law and democracy refl ect, 
among other things, institutions put in place to address social problems, the 
decision about which problems to allocate to each (and, no less importantly, 
which to neither) are matters that diff erent communities will decide diff erently 
on the basis of their unique factual environment as well as their political tradition. 
Th is suggests that the question that occupies—even defi nes—contemporary 
analytic jurisprudence—“what is law?”—cannot be answered in isolation from 
an account of the space other institutions within the polity have left for law. Th at 
space is likely to be diff erent in diff erent times and places.
C. MODEL-BASED VERSUS NATURE-BASED JURISPRUDENCE
If one thing should be clear from this article, it is that I believe it is impossible to 
understand the major jurisprudential debates of the last decades in isolation from 
political arguments about the role law should play in bringing out certain goals 
and the way law does that. It is also clear, I hope, that my argument does not 
depend on some kind of general skepticism about meaning or conceptual content. 
Th ere are limits, conceptual if you wish, to what meaning the term “law” could 
bear. Determining what those limits are is, I think, largely an empirical question, not 
a philosophical one, and it does not become less empirical when the investigation 
is conducted by introspection. One way of understanding the challenge posed 
to conceptualist accounts of jurisprudence in this article is that such accounts 
assume that once legal philosophers apply their tools to the concept of law, we 
could have a single reasonably precise account of what law is, of its “nature.” 122 
Th is approach thus equates the identifi cation of a set of necessary and suffi  cient 
conditions for something being law with law’s nature. Th is is sometimes presented 
as though that is the only natural way, indeed the only possible way, for engaging 
in this inquiry. As Raz put it recently, “A theory [of law] consists of necessary 
truths, for only necessary truths about the law reveal the nature of the law.”123 In 
122. See e.g. Raz, Between Authority, supra note 1 at 17-18; Shapiro, Legality, supra note 9 at 1-10; 
see also the sources cited in supra notes 1-2.
123. Between Authority, supra note 1 at 24; for an earlier statement to the same eff ect see Raz, 
Authority of Law, supra note 1 at 104-05; see also Robert Alexy, “On the Concept and the 
Nature of Law” (2008) 21:3 Ratio Juris 281 at 290 (“Enquiring into the nature of something 
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line with this view, all those engaged in general jurisprudence accept this 
understanding of what the debate is about, but disagree over what the best 
account of the nature of law is. 
What is hardly ever defended, and indeed what is sometimes dismissed 
without argument, is that at bottom there could be more than a single account.124 
Th is dismissal represents a huge assumption, but surprisingly not one for which 
it is easy to fi nd a defence.125 Th is article can be understood as a stab at this 
assumption, on the basis of the idea that part of what makes something law 
involves competing normative attitudes. If that is the case, the best way to 
develop this idea further is by understanding diff erent accounts of law as 
refl ecting competing models of law.  
Here we can once again benefi t from existing discussions in democratic 
theory. Th ese discussions are hardly ever presented as confl icting attempts at 
capturing what democracy or the nature of democracy is. What one does fi nd in 
the literature are discussions of diff erent models of democracy. Th ese diff erent 
models are “theoretical construction[s] designed to reveal and explain the chief 
elements of a democratic form and its underlying structure of relations.” 126 Th e 
model approach entails some vague ideas—some more structural, others more 
overtly normative—that have more or less clear ties to democracy such as majority 
rule, self-government, individual rights, and limited government. One may debate 
the value of the various divisions, or the classifi cation of a certain instance of 
democracy in one category or another, but, to the best of my knowledge, the 
diff erent models are treated as analytical aids for discussing normative questions, 
not as ends in themselves. 
Th e same, I contend, could and should be the shape of general jurisprudence. 
Models of law are possible ways of realizing competing normative possibilities 
with the law. Th is approach takes as its object of inquiry a fairly well recognized 
is to enquire into its necessary properties. Th us, for the question ‘What is the nature of law?’ 
one may substitute the question ‘What are the necessary properties of law?’”).
124. In a recent book, Shapiro mentions this possibility but does not even bother responding to it, 
proceeding immediately to consider other “more plausible possibilit[ies].” Legality, supra note 
9 at 17.
125. It is, in fact, an assumption that I have argued elsewhere is false. See Priel, “Jurisprudence,” 
supra note 66; Danny Priel, “Th e Boundaries of Law and the Purpose of Legal Philosophy” 
(2008) 27:6 Law & Phil 643.
126. David Held, Models of Democracy, 3d ed (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006) at 6; see 
also CB Macpherson, Th e Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977) at 2-3 (using the term “‘model’ … to mean a theoretical construction intended 
to exhibit and explain the real relations, underlying the appearances, between or within the 
phenomena under study”).
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set of phenomena, and while it takes some care to demarcate them, it considers 
this task both preliminary to the real inquiry and intrinsically unimportant. 
Indeed, for the sake of the more central question that is to follow, the answer to 
the question “what is law?” has to remain quite loose. Th e focus on models aims 
to shift attention from that question to this one: In what ways can diff erent 
possible versions (or articulations) of this phenomenon be used? Or, somewhat 
more weakly, what implications and eff ects does the adoption of diff erent versions 
(articulations) have? 
Some comments on the model conception of jurisprudence are in order. 
First, it may be that diff erent models will see diff erent cases of law as paradigmatic, 
marginal, and in some cases outside the boundary of what counts as law. Th is is 
an obvious but important point because it shows that the models conception and 
the nature conception of jurisprudence are not complementary. It would be a 
mistake to assume that all diff erent models must presuppose a single underlying 
nature. Second, the model conception recognizes the fact that law is a human 
product, and therefore that the answer to the question “what is law?” will depend, 
to a degree at least, on ideas about the way in which law is being used. Th ird, this 
approach will be cognizant of political theory, as diff erent models of law develop 
within an environment of political ideas.127 Finally, and most importantly, models 
are designed to leave something out, because “[l]eaving something out is not a 
feature of failed explanations, but of successful explanations.”128 Th is means that 
being a necessary or even prevalent feature of the explained phenomenon is not 
necessarily a condition for inclusion in a model. Quite the contrary: Th e very 
possibility of having diff erent models of law presupposes that they will highlight 
diff erent aspects of law in order to demonstrate diff erent possible manifestations 
of it. It is thus appropriate to exaggerate (or caricature) a certain feature of 
the explained phenomenon to bring it to attention or to argue for its greater 
normative signifi cance.
With this perspective in mind, we can turn back to the competing approaches 
I discuss earlier in this article. I think it is fair to say that both the competing 
guidance-positivist story of Hart and others and the participation anti-positivist 
story of Dworkin are obviously inadequate as descriptions of the nature or 
127. Cf Held, supra note 126 at 6. Held states: 
 An aspect of public life or set of institutions can be properly understood only in terms 
of its connections with other social phenomena. Models are, accordingly, complex 
‘networks’ of concepts and generalizations about aspects of the political realm and its key 
conditions of entrenchment, including economic and social conditions.
128. Daniel C Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991) at 454.
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essence of law. Th eir inadequacy is apparent the moment one takes a step a back 
and compares them to the diversity and complexity of legal phenomena that 
exist even in the world today, let alone those that existed in ancient times. It is 
tempting to say that the fact such accounts are even considered candidates for 
describing the nature of law tells us something about how little interest legal 
philosophers take in actual, real-world law. By contrast, if such accounts are treated 
as models, then they seem much less problematic. Th ey are not supposed to be 
short descriptions of what makes something law, but rather accounts that seek to 
highlight an important feature of law, and as such they are more successful. Th at 
lighter descriptive burden also makes these accounts more valuable in dealing with 
other questions: these accounts can be debated and there is an obvious point to 
the debate; they can potentially be refi ned or even combined with each other or 
with other models; they can help explain historical events, economic developments 
and so on; they can be compared or aligned with diff erent models of democracy, 
political ideologies, approaches to economic organization, and so on; and they 
can be used to explain the diff erences among various legal systems that go beyond 
their diverse substantive rules.
IV. CONCLUSION
Th is article poses two challenges to mainstream analytic jurisprudence. First, by 
focusing on democracy and comparing it to law, I seek to challenge the view 
that contemporary debates between legal positivists and their main anti-positivist 
contender, Ronald Dworkin, are conceptual. In saying this, I am siding with 
Dworkin, who has argued that legal positivists’ theories are grounded in normative 
theory, and I am rejecting the positivists’ own description of their work as 
purely conceptual. 129 Th e second point I seek to demonstrate is the philosophical 
signifi cance of institutional design. Seemingly technical questions that do not 
receive much attention in the writings of legal philosophers, such as the way legal 
change is brought about, are more important to the foundational questions of 
129. See the sources in supra note 2. Some legal positivists have acknowledged the political edge 
of their theory, and have advanced arguments for a particular model, one for example in 
which laws are adopted in such a way as to reduce the scope of possible moral deliberation 
by courts. Th is view has been called “ethical positivism,” and it has often been clearly 
distinguished from conceptual positivism. Th at the two are distinct has been defended by 
both “ethical positivists” and “conceptual positivists.” See Tom D Campbell, Th e Legal Th eory 
of Ethical Positivism (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996) at 69-73 (defence of the distinction by an 
ethical positivist); Marmor, Philosophy of Law, supra note 2 at 115 (defence of the distinction 
by a conceptual positivist).
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jurisprudence than most legal philosophers allow. Most jurisprudential work is 
highly abstract, assuming that it is only by keeping their distance from legal practice 
that philosophers could have a suffi  ciently general view of the law. What I seek to 
show is that for an illuminating account of law such theories must pay closer 
attention to actual legal practice. Matters like judicial nomination procedure, 
judicial salary, length of judicial tenure, the scope of the right to appeal, and so 
on may all tell us signifi cant things about what law is. Th e design of social 
institutions—including law—is aff ected by (and in return aff ects) political 
ideology, and it is impossible to separate the question of nature from the question 
of particular design. Th e point is true, of course, with regard to the internal 
design of the institution of law—the way its courts perceive their role, the way 
they justify their decisions—but also to the question of design from a broader 
perspective, namely law’s external interaction with other institutions: bureaucracy, 
markets, democracy, and so on.
On this point Dworkin has been just as guilty as the legal positivists. 
Highlighting the similarity in arguments that both positivists and Dworkin 
employ to justify law reveals a shortcoming in their positions exactly because 
of their insuffi  cient attention to the signifi cance of questions of institutional 
design to questions of legitimacy. It is at least arguable that diff erent institutions 
within the state do not just deal with diff erent problems, but also have varying 
legitimation mechanisms. More generally, this view provides the groundwork for 
a more conscious discussion of the relationship between law, other institutions, 
and legitimacy. 
A fi nal benefi t of this argument is to show the way for reconnecting analytic 
jurisprudence with political theory and the work of other legal academics. Even 
among analytic jurisprudents there is a sense that the subject matter has grown 
isolated, and that it deals with questions that strike even those engaged with them 
as pointless.130 I suspect the main reason for this is the jurisprudential obsession with 
the question “what is law?” and the assumption—often made without argument—
that this question can (and must) be answered without appeal to political or 
moral considerations. I believe one key to ending this isolation of jurisprudence 
is recognizing the inseparability of jurisprudence from political theory. 
130. See e.g. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence, supra note 63 at 2 (describing the world of 
contemporary jurisprudence as “small, hermetic—and rather incestuous”); Shapiro, Legality, 
supra note 9 at 32 (admitting that “jurisprudence as it is currently practiced is too removed 
from the everyday activity of lawyers and judges”); Marmor, Philosophy of Law, supra note 2 
at 95 (admitting that some contemporary jurisprudential debates have “degenerated to hair-
splitting arguments about something that makes very little diff erence to begin with”).
